That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to show in every particular, if I would examine them at large singly:  but I shall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a less, upon uncertain guesses; and before a due examination be made, proportionable to the weightiness of the matter, and the concernment it is to us not to mistake.  This I think every one must confess, especially if he considers the usual cause of this wrong judgment, whereof these following are some:—­

69.  Causes of this.

(i) ignorance:  He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss.

(ii) inadvertency:  When a man overlooks even that which he does know.  This is an affected and present ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much as the other.  Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lie.  If therefore either side be huddled up in haste, and several of the sums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance.  That which most commonly causes this is, the prevalency of some present pleasure or pain, heightened by our feeble passionate nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present.  To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reason were given us, if we will make a right use of them, to search and see, and then judge thereupon.  How much sloth and negligence, heat and passion, the prevalency of fashion or acquired indispositions do severally contribute, on occasion, to these wrong judgments, I shall not here further inquire.  I shall only add one other false judgment, which I think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, though of great influence.

70.  Wrong judgment of what is necessary to our Happiness.

All men desire happiness, that is past doubt:  but, as has been already observed, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endeared to them; to rest satisfied in that; and so being happy, till some new desire, by making them uneasy, disturbs that happiness, and shows them that they are not so, they look no further; nor is the will determined to any action in pursuit of any other known or apparent good.  For since we find that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our desires on every apparent greater good, unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness:  if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not.  This is another occasion to men of judging wrong; when they take not that to be necessary to their happiness which really is so.  This mistake misleads us, both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good.