3.  Universal Consent proves nothing innate.

This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

4.  “What is is,” and “It is possible for the same Thing to be and not to be,” not universally assented to.

But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such:  because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent.  I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate.  These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it.  But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

5.  Not on Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c.

For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them.  And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths:  it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not:  imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived.  For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.  If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions.  For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown?  To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing.  No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of.  For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted:  since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it;