41.  The most pressing Uneasiness naturally determines the Will.

But we being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with different desires, the next inquiry naturally will be,—­Which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action? and to that the answer is,—­That ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed.  For, the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable:  that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its labour; for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure:  they in that case put us not upon endeavours.  But, these set apart the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will, successively, in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives.  The greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action, that is constantly most felt, and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action.  For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else.  For we producing nothing by our willing it, but some action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no further.

42.  All desire Happiness.

If it be further asked,—­What it is moves desire?  I answer,—­happiness, and that alone.  Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; it is what be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil; yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because, when they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference.  So that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison:  for the cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleasure, has the nature of good, and vice versa.

43. [* missing]

44.  What Good is desired, what not.

Though this be that which is called good and evil, and all good be the proper object of desire in general; yet all good, even seen and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular man’s desire; but only that part, or so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness.  All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man’s desires who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfy himself.  Happiness, under this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it:  other things,