in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it,) though yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain.  Whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; and consequently, that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.

31.  Uneasiness determines the Will.

To return, then, to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions?  And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under.  This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform.  This uneasiness we may call, as it is, desire; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good.  All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness:  and with this is always joined desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness felt; and is scarce distinguishable from it.  For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire; nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it.  Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good; and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal.  As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it.  But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire equal to itself:  because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is.  And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire.  But so much as there is anywhere of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

32.  Desire is Uneasiness.

That desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find.  Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it,) that it being ‘deferred makes the heart sick’; and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire, which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, ‘Give me children,’ give me the thing desired, ‘or I die.’  Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.

33.  The Uneasiness of Desire determines the Will.