First, That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, make it to exist or not exist, so far he is free.  For if I can, by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or vice versa, it is evident, that in respect of that I am free:  and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace:  and as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free.  For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will?  And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest, so far can he do what he will.  For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it:  and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills.  So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him.

22.  In respect of willing, a Man is not free.

But the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this:  freedom, unless it reaches further than this, will not serve the turn:  and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills.  Concerning a man’s liberty, there yet, therefore, is raised this further question, whether A man be free to will? which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free.  And as to that I imagine.

23.  How a man cannot be free to will.

Secondly, That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free.  The reason whereof is very manifest.  For, it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist, and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence or non-existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one or the other; i.e. prefer the one to the other:  since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow follows by the choice and determination of his mind; that is, by his willing it:  for if he did not will it, it would not be.  So that, in respect of the act of willing, a man is not free:  liberty consisting in a power to act or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, has not.