CHAPTER XVII.

Of infinity.

1.  Infinity, in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.

He that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of infinity, cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed; and then how the mind comes to frame it.

Finite and infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution by the addition or subtraction of any the least part:  and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number, which we have considered in the foregoing chapters.  It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great God, of whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite:  but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in respect to his duration and ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness, and other attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c.  For, when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity but what carries with it some reflection on, and imitation of, that number or extent of the acts or objects of God’s power, wisdom, and goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many, which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can, with all the infinity of endless number.  I do not pretend to say how these attributes are in God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities:  they do, without doubt, contain in them all possible perfection:  but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them, and these our ideas of their infinity.

2.  The Idea of Finite easily got.

Finite then, and infinite, being by the mind looked on as modifications of expansion and duration, the next thing to be considered, is,—­how the mind comes by them.  As for the idea of finite, there is no great difficulty.  The obvious portions of extension that affect our senses, carry with them into the mind the idea of finite:  and the ordinary periods of succession, whereby we measure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are bounded lengths.  The difficulty is, how we come by those boundless ideas of eternity and immensity; since the objects we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largeness.

3.  How we come by the Idea of Infinity.