The Trans-Missouri Case was argued on December 8, 1896, very elaborately and by the most eminent counsel.  After long consideration, and profound reflection, Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the majority of the tribunal, laid down a general principle in conformity to the legislative will, precisely as Marshall had laid down a general principle in the Dartmouth College Case, or Story in the Charles River Bridge Case, or Waite in Munn v.  Illinois, or Bradley in the Minnesota Rate Case.  Then the process of agitation immediately began.  In the words of Mr. Justice Harlan, fifteen years later:  “But those who were in combinations that were illegal did not despair.  They at once set up the baseless claim that the decision of 1896 disturbed the ’business interests of the country,’ and let it be known that they would never be content until the rule was established that would permit interstate commerce to be subjected to reasonable restraints."[34]

Other great causes, involving the same issue, were tried, the question was repeatedly reargued, but the Supreme Court tenaciously adhered to its general principle, that, under the Sherman Act, all restraints of trade, or monopolies, were unlawful, and, therefore, the Court had but two matters before it, first to define a restraint of trade or a monopoly, second to determine whether the particular combination complained of fell within that definition.  No discretion was permitted.  Judicial duty ended there.

The Court being found to be inflexible, recourse was had to Congress, and a bill in the form of an amendment to the Sherman Act was brought into the Senate authorizing, in substance, those who felt unsafe under the law, to apply to certain government officials, to be permitted to produce evidence of the reasonable methods they employed, and, if the evidence were satisfactory, to receive, what was tantamount to, an indulgence.  The subject thus reopened, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary went into the whole question of monopoly anew, and in 1909 Senator Nelson presented an exhaustive report against the proposed relaxation.  Thereupon the Senate indefinitely postponed further consideration of the amendment.  The chief reasons given by Senator Nelson were summed up in a single sentence:  “The defence of reasonable restraint would be made in every case and there would be as many different rules of reasonableness as cases, courts, and juries....  To amend the anti-trust act, as suggested by this bill, would be to entirely emasculate it, and for all practical purposes render it nugatory as a remedial statute....  The act as it exists is clear, comprehensive, certain and highly remedial.  It practically covers the field of federal jurisdiction, and is in every respect a model law.  To destroy or undermine it at the present juncture, ... would be a calamity.

“In view of the foregoing, your committee recommend the indefinite postponement of the bill."[35]