[Sidenote:  Against interference in Afghanistan.]

I am very much averse to any interference on our part in the quarrel which is now on foot in Afghanistan; and, indeed, I do not very well see my way as to how any such interference can be managed without entailing responsibilities which we may regret at a later period.  You are doubtless aware that we have no agent with the Dost.  He particularly requested that no one should be sent to his court in that capacity, and we assented to his views on this point.  All we know of what is going on there is derived from the reports of a native vakeel, who reports more or less faithfully what he hears and sees, but who is not, and I apprehend, could not be employed to speak on our behalf to the Ameer.  In order, therefore, to communicate with him, we must either send a special agent, or write.  Now it must be observed that in this affair the Dost has not been the aggressor.  The Herat chief attacked him without any provocation.  We offered him no assistance, made no remonstrance, and left him to take care of himself.  He has asked us for nothing, and we have given him nothing.  It is now proposed that we should inform the Dost that if he goes beyond a certain point, and Persia comes into the field to support Herat, he must not expect any assistance from us.  If we had an agent there it would be easy to instruct him to make such an intimation; and if the Dost were to ask us for any support, an answer which would convey this hint might be given.  But situated as we are, we must move cautiously in this matter.  If the Dost stops on our suggestion, and if (as is frequently the case with Orientals), the enemy, ascribing his moderation to weakness, presses him with increased vigour, what are we to do then?  Are we to stand by and laugh at our dupe, telling him that though our advice got him into the scrape, he must find his own way out of it? or are we to set to work to check his opponents? and if we undertake the latter task, how far will it lead us?

It is quite impossible in these affairs, and with people of this description, to say what an hour may bring forth.  A shower of rain may convert a victorious army into a baffled one, and an advance into a retreat.  The death of a man of eighty years of age will probably throw all Afghanistan into confusion, convert friends into foes and vice versa.  Instructions framed in Calcutta to meet one set of circumstances may arrive in Afghanistan when the whole scene has changed.  I own that I am strongly of opinion that our true policy is to leave these kinds of neighbours as much as possible alone; to mix ourselves up as little as may be in their miserable intrigues, which generally entail obligations which bind us and not them, and not unfrequently lead to most unexpected issues.  We should only speak when we have a case of self-interest so clear that we can speak with determination, and follow up our talk if necessary with a blow.

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