To Sir Charles Wood.

    Calcutta, April 9th, 1862.

[Sidenote:  The Army.]

Now for the Army.  I must observe, in the first place, that in the reasoning employed here in favour of the maintenance of a large army, native and European, there is a good deal that is circular, and puzzling to a beginner.

When I ask why so considerable a native army is required, I am told that the native must bear a certain proportion to the European force; that Europeans cannot undertake cantonment duties, or, speaking generally, any of the duties which the military may from time to time be called to render in support of the civil power, during peace; that in war, again, they are admirable on the battle-field, but that they cannot turn their victories to account by following up a discomfited foe, unless they have the aid of native troops, nor perform many other services which are not less indispensable than great battles to success against an enemy who knows the ground and is inured to the climate.

This line of argument very naturally raises the question, wherefore then is the maintenance of so large a European army necessary?  Rebellion has been crushed, and European troops are not suited for the repression of such local disturbances as occasionally occur.  There is little present prospect of war from without, though Persia is moving towards Herat, and apparently preparing for Dost Mohammed’s death.  The answer which I invariably receive is this—­’You cannot tell what will happen in India.  Heretofore you have held the Sikhs in subjection by the aid of the Sepoys, and the Sepoys by means of the Sikhs.  But see what is happening now.  The Sikh soldiers are quartered all over India.  They are fraternising with the natives of the South—­adopting their customs and even their faith.  Half the soldiers in a regiment lately stationed at Benares were converted to Hindooism before they left that holy place.  Beware, or you will shortly have to cope in India with a hostile combination more formidable than any of those which you have encountered before.’  If you draw from all this the inference that what you really dread is your native army, you get into the vicious circle again.

Do not suppose that I am tempted by these logical paradoxes to run to hasty conclusions.  I am aware that for many reasons we must now entertain, and probably shall long find it necessary to entertain, a large army, native and European, in India.  Practically, what we have to do is to endeavour, by a judicious system of recruiting, organisation, and distribution, to render our army as serviceable and as little a source of peril as may be.  But I do think that they go far to prove that, notwithstanding our vast physical superiority to anything which can be brought against us, we should find it a difficult task to maintain our authority in India by the sword alone; and that they justify