lines of the cavalry tents; the troops drawn up in the foreground in all their variety of colour and costume, from the two squadrons of H.M.’s Dragoon Guards on the right to the two squadrons of Fane’s light-blue Sikh Irregulars on the left; the experiments with the Armstrong guns—­from one of which a shell was fired which went over the hills and vanished into space, no one knows whither—­will all be described by a more graphic pen than mine.  The weather was excellent.  Enough covering over the sky to prevent the rays of the sun from striking us too fiercely, and yet no rain.  The proceedings of the day terminated by some tours de force of the Sikh cavalry and their officers; wrenching tent-pegs from the ground with their lances, and cutting oranges with their sabres when at full gallop.  Everything went to confirm the favourable opinion of the state of the army here which I expressed in my last letter.  Hope Grant seems very much liked.  It can hardly be otherwise, for there is a quiet simplicity and kindliness about his manner which, in a man so highly placed, must be most winning.  I am particularly struck by the grin of delight with which the men of a regiment of Sikhs (infantry) who were with him at Lucknow, greet him whenever they meet him.  I observed on this to him, and he said:  ’Oh, we were always good friends.  I used to visit them when they were sick, poor fellows.  They are in many ways different from the Mohammedans.  Their wives used to come in numbers, and walk over the house where Lady Grant and I lived.’  The contrast with what I saw when I was in China before, in regard to the treatment of the natives, is most remarkable.  There seems to be really no plundering or bullying.  In so far as I can see, we have here at present a truly model army and navy:  not however, I fear, a cheap one.

The Admiral told me last night he had written to the Admiralty to say that, looking to the future, he believed there were two distinct operations by which the Pekin Government could be coerced,—­either by a military force on a large scale such as this, or by a blockade of the Gulf of Pecheli, undertaken early in the year, &c.  I was glad to hear him say this, because I recommended the latter course immediately after we heard of the Peiho disaster, with a view to save all this expenditure; and I still think that if the measures which I advised had been adopted, including the sending up to the north of China two or three regiments (enough, with the assistance of the fleet, to take the Taku Forts), much of this outlay might have been spared.

Sunday, July 15th.—­I have been on board the Admiral’s ship for church.  Afterwards I had some talk with him in regard to future proceedings. ...  The problem we have to solve here is a very difficult one; for while we are up here for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on the Emperor, as a means of placing our relations with China on a proper footing, we have news from the South which looks as if the Government of the Empire was about to pass out of his feeble hands into those of the Rebels, who have upon us the claim that they profess a kind of Christianity.

[Sidenote:  A birthday.]