[Sidenote: Arrival at Hongkong.]
Hong-Kong.—July 3rd.—I am headachy and fagged, for I have had some hours of the most fatiguing of all things—a succession of interviews, beginning with the Admiral, General, &c,... I found the Admiral strong on the point that Canton is the only place where we ought to fight.... However, I hope we may get off to the North in about ten days,—as soon as we have sent off these letters, and got (as we ought) two mails from home.
July 9th.—An interval ... during which I have been doing a good many things, my greatest enjoyment and pleasure being the receipt at last of two sets of letters from home.... I have a great heap of despatches, some of which seem rather likely to perplex me. I daresay, however, that I shall see my way through the mist in a day or two.... I had a levee last evening, which was largely attended. The course which I am about to follow does not square with the views of the merchants, but I gave an answer to their address, which gave them for the moment wonderful satisfaction.... A document, taken in one of the Chinese junks lately captured, states that ‘Devils’ heads are fallen in price,’—an announcement not strictly complimentary, but reassuring to you as regards our safety.
[Sidenote: Change of plans.]
Up to this time Lord Elgin had not entirely given up the hope that the troops which he had detached to Calcutta might be restored to him before the setting in of winter should make it impossible to proceed, as his instructions required, to the mouth of the Peiho, and there open negotiations with the Court of Pekin. But on the 14th of July came letters from Lord Canning, written in a strain of deeper anxiety than any that had preceded; and giving no hope that any troops could be spared from India for many months to come. At the same time Lord Elgin learned that the French, on whose co-operation he counted, could not act until the arrival of the chief of the mission, Baron Gros, who was not expected to reach China till the end of September. In this state of things, to remain at Hong-Kong was worse than useless. The sight of his inaction, and the knowledge of the reasons which enforced it, could not fail to damage the position of England with the public of China, both Chinese and foreign. He formed, therefore, the sudden resolution to proceed in person to Calcutta, where he would be within easier reach of telegraphic instructions from England; where he would have the advantage of personal communication with Lord Canning, and of learning for himself at what time he might expect to have any troops at his command; and where, moreover, his appearance might have a moral effect in support of the Government greater than the amount of any material force at his disposal.