“The loss of these redoubts may be considered as deciding the fate of the British troops.  The post was indeed originally so weak and insufficient to resist the force that attacked it, that nothing but the assured expectation of relief from the garrison of New York, could have induced the commander to undertake its defence, and calmly to wait the approaches of the enemy.  An officer of so unquestionable gallantry would, rather have hazarded an encounter in the field, and trusted his adventure to the decision of fortune, than by cooping his army in so inadequate a fortress, to have prepared for them inevitable misfortune and disgrace.  But with the expectations he had been induced to form, he did not think himself justified in having recourse to desperate expedients.

“These hopes were now at an end.  The enemy had already silenced his batteries.  Nothing remained to hinder them from completing their second parallel, three hundred yards nearer to the besieged than the first.  His lordship had received no intelligence of the approach of succours, and a probability did not remain that he could defend his station till such time as he could expect their arrival.  Thus circumstanced, with the magnanimity peculiar to him, he wrote to Sir Henry Clinton, to acquaint him with the posture of his affairs, and to recommend to the fleet and the army that they should not make any great risk in endeavouring to extricate them.

“But although he regarded his situation as hopeless, he did not neglect any effort becoming a general, to lengthen the siege, and procrastinate the necessity of a surrender, if it was impossible finally to prevent it.  The number of his troops seemed scarcely sufficient to countenance a considerable sally, but the emergency was so critical, that he ordered about three hundred and fifty men, on the morning of the 16th, to attack the batteries that appeared to be in the greatest forwardness, and to spike their guns.  The assault was impetuous and successful.  But either from their having executed the business upon which they were sent in a hasty and imperfect manner, or from the activity and industry of the enemy, the damage was repaired, and the batteries completed before evening.

“One choice only remained.  To carry the troops across to Gloucester Point, and make one last effort to escape.  Boats were accordingly prepared, and at ten o’clock at night the army began to embark.  The first embarkation arrived in safety.  The greater part of the troops were already landed.  At this critical moment of hope and apprehension, of expectation and danger, the weather, which had hitherto been moderate and calm, suddenly changed; the sky was clouded, the wind rose and a violent storm ensued.  The boats with the remaining troops were borne down the stream.  To complete the anxiety and danger, the batteries of the enemy were opened, the day dawned, and their efforts were directed against