There is first the psychological fact that inexactness of statement, exaggeration, unreality in speech, are sure to react upon the mental habit of the person himself, and upon the estimate in which his statements are held by others.  In dealing with children, also, however convenient a romancing statement might momentarily be, it is unquestionable that exact truthfulness is the only way which does not lead to mischief.  Even in dealing with animals, it pays in the long run to be truthful.  The horse that is caught once by false pretenses will not be long in finding out the trick.  The physician also who dissembles, quickly comes to lose the confidence of his patient, and has thereafter no way of getting himself believed."[1]

[Footnote 1:  Bowne’s Principles of Ethics, p. 224.]

The main question is not whether it is fair toward an animal for a man to lie to him, but whether it is fair toward a man’s self, or toward God the maker of animals and of men, for a man to lie to an animal.  A lie has no place, even theoretically, in the universe, unless it be in some sphere where God has no cognizance and man has no individuality.

* * * * *

It were useless to follow farther the ever-varying changes of the never-varying reasonings for the justification of the unjustifiable “lie of necessity” in the course of the passing centuries.  It is evident that the specious arguments put forth by young Chrysostom, in defense of his inexcusable lie of love fifteen centuries ago, have neither been added to nor improved on by any subsequent apologist of lying and deception.  The action of Chrysostom is declared by his biographers to be “utterly at variance with the principles of truth and honor,” one which “every sound Christian conscience must condemn;” yet those modern ethical writers who find force and reasonableness in his now venerable though often-refuted fallacies, are sure that the moral sense of the race is with Chrysostom.

Every man who recognizes the binding force of intuitions of a primal law of truthfulness, and who gives weight to a priori arguments for the unchanging opposition of truth and falsehood, either admits, in his discussion of this question, that a lie is never justifiable, or he is obviously illogical and inconsistent in his processes of reasoning, and in his conclusions.  Even those who deny any a priori argument for the superiority of truthfulness over falsehood, and whose philosophy rests on the experimental evidence of the good or evil of a given course, are generally inclined to condemn any departure from strict truthfulness as in its tendencies detrimental to the interests of society, aside from any question of its sinfulness.  The only men who are thoroughly consistent in their arguments in favor of occasional lying, are those who start with the false premise that there is no higher law of ethics than that of such a love for one’s neighbor as will make one ready to do whatever seems likely to advantage him in the present life.