[Footnote 1:  Leslie Stephen’s Science of Ethics, pp. 202-209.]

[Footnote 2:  See pp. 26-32, supra.]

But Leslie Stephen sees that, in the progress of the race, the importance of veracity has come to a recognition, “in which it differs from the other virtues.”  While the law of marriage may vary at different periods, “the rule of truthfulness, on the other hand, seems to possess the a priori quality of a mathematical axiom....  Truth, in short, being always the same, truthfulness must be unvarying.  Thus, ‘Be truthful’ means, ’Speak the truth whatever the consequences, whether the teller or the hearer receives benefit or injury.’  And hence, it is inferred, truthfulness implies a quality independent of the organization of the agent or of society.”  While Mr. Stephen would himself find a place for the “lie of necessity” under conceivable circumstances, he is clear-minded enough to perceive that the moral sense of the civilized world is opposed to this view; and in this he is nearer correct than those who claim the opposite.

It is true that those who seek an approbation of their defense of falsehoods which they deem a necessity, assume, without proof, their agreement with the moral sense of the race.  But it is also true that there stands opposed to their theory the best moral sense of primitive man, as shown in a wide area of investigation, and also of thinkers all the way up from the lowest moral grade to the most rigorous moralists, including intuitionists, utilitarians, and agnostics.  However deficient may be the practice of erring mortals, the ideal standard in theory, is veracity, and not falsehood.

As to the opinions of purely speculative philosophers, concerning the admissibility of the “lie of necessity,” they have little value except as personal opinions.  This question is one that cannot be discussed fairly without relation to the nature and law of God.  It is of interest, however, to note that a keen mind like Kant’s insists that “the highest violation of the duty owed by man to himself, considered as a moral being singly (owed to the humanity subsisting in his person), is a departure from truth, or lying."[1] And when a man like Fichte,[2] whom Carlyle characterizes as “that cold, colossal, adamantine spirit, standing erect like a Cato Major among degenerate men; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoa, and to have discoursed of beauty and virtue in the groves of Academe,” declares that no measure of evil results from truth-speaking would induce him to tell a lie, a certain moral weight attaches to his testimony.  And so with all the other philosophers.  No attempt at exhaustiveness in their treatment is made in this work.  But the fullest force of any fresh argument made by them in favor of occasional lying is recognized so far as it is known.

[Footnote 1:  See Semple’s Kant’s Metaphysic of Ethics, p. 267.]

[Footnote 2:  See Martensen’s Christian Ethics (Individual), sec. 97.]