[Footnote 1:  See pp. 9-32, supra.]

It would seem, indeed, that, notwithstanding his sound basis of principles, which recognizes the incompatibility of falsehood with true manhood and with man’s duty to his fellows, Dr. Smyth does not carry with him in his argument the idea of the essential sinfulness of a lie, and therefore he is continually inconsistent with himself.  He says, for example, in speaking of the suspension of social duties in war time:  “If the war is justifiable, the ethics of warfare come at once into play.  It would be absurd to say that it is right to kill an enemy, but not to deceive him.  Falsehood, it may be admitted, as military strategy, is justifiable, if the war is righteous.”

Here, again, is the interchange of the terms “deception” and “falsehood.”  But unless this is an intentional jugglery of words, which is not to be supposed, this means that it would be absurd to say that it is right to kill an enemy, but not right to tell him a falsehood.  And nothing could more clearly show Dr. Smyth’s error of mind on this whole subject than this declaration.  “Absurd” to claim that while it is right to take a man’s life in open warfare, in a just cause, it would not be right to forfeit one’s personal worth, and to destroy one’s personal integrity, which Dr. Smyth says are involved in a falsehood!  “Absurd” to claim that while God who is the author of life can justify the taking of life, he cannot justify the sin of lying!  No, no, the absurdity of the case is not on that side of the line.

There is no consistency of argument on this subject in Dr. Smyth’s work.  His premises are sound.  His reasoning is confused and inconsistent.  “Not only in some cases of necessity is falsehood permissible, but we may recognize a positive obligation of love to the concealment of the truth,” he says.  Here again is that apparent confounding of unjustifiable “falsehood” with perfectly proper “concealment of truth.”  He continues:  “Other duties which under such circumstances have become paramount, may require the preservation of one’s own or another’s life through a falsehood.  Not only ought one not to tell the truth under the supposed conditions, but, if the principle assumed be sound, a good conscience may proceed to enforce a positive obligation of untruthfulness....  There are occasions when the interests of society and the highest motives of Christian love may render it much more preferable to discharge the duty of self-defense through the humanity of a successful falsehood, than by the barbarity of a stunning blow or a pistol-shot.  General benevolence demands that the lesser evil, if possible, rather than the greater, should be inflicted on another.”