Having claimed that a lie necessarily includes falsity of statement, an intention to deceive, and “a violation of some obligation,” Dr. Hodge goes on to show that “every lie is a violation of a promise,” as growing out of the nature of human society, where “every man is expected to speak the truth, and is under a tacit but binding promise not to deceive his neighbor by word or act.”  And, after all this, he is inclined to admit that there are cases in which falsehoods with the intention of deceiving are not lying, and are justifiable.  “This, however,” he goes on to say, “is not always admitted.  Augustine, for example, makes every intentional deception, no matter what the object or what the circumstances, to be sinful.”  And then, in artless simplicity, Dr. Hodge concludes:  “This would be the simplest ground for the moralist to take.  But as shown above, and as generally admitted, there are cases of intentional deception which are not criminal.”

According to the principles laid down at the start by Dr. Hodge, there is no place for a lie in God’s service; but according to the inferences of Dr. Hodge, in the discussion of this question, there are places where falsehoods spoken with intent to deceive are admissible in God’s sight and service.  His whole treatment of this subject reminds me of an incident in my army-prison life, where this question as a question was first forced upon my attention.  The Union prisoners, in Columbia at that time, received their rations from the Confederate authorities, and had them cooked in their own way, and at their own expense, by an old colored woman whom they employed for the purpose.  Two of us had a dislike for onions in our stew, while the others were well pleased with them.  So we two agreed with old “Maggie,” for a small consideration, to prepare us a separate mess without onions.  The next day our mess came by itself.  We took it, and began our meal with peculiar satisfaction; but the first taste showed us an unmistakable onion flavor in our stew.  When old Maggie came again, we remonstrated with her on her breach of engagement.  “Bless your hearts, honeys,” she replied, “you must have some onions in your stew!” She could not comprehend the possibility of a beef stew without onions, even though she had formally agreed to make it.

Dr. Hodge’s premises in the discussion of the duty of truthfulness rule out onions; but his inferences and conclusions have the odor and the taste of onions.  He stands on a safe platform to begin with; but he is an unsafe guide when he walks away from it.  His arguments in this case are an illustration of his own declaration:  “An adept in logic may be a very poor reasoner.”