[Footnote 1:  Hence the casuistry of the Schoolmen and of the Jesuits, and the question of Mental Reservations, and of “Probabilities,” are not treated in detail here.]

Some of the zealous defenders of the principles and methods of the Jesuits affirm that, in their advocacy of dissimulation and prevarication in the interests of a good cause, the Jesuits do not intend to justify lying, but are pointing out methods of proper concealment which are not within the realm of the lie.  In this (waiving the question whether these defenders are right or not as to the fact) they seem even more desirous of being counted against lying than those teachers, in the Romish Church or among Protestants, who boldly affirm that a lie itself is sometimes justifiable.  Thus it is claimed by a Roman Catholic writer, in defense of the Jesuits, that Liguori, their favorite theologian, taught “that to speak falsely is immutably a sin against God.  It may be permitted under no circumstances, not even to save life.  Pope Innocent III. says, ’Not even to defend our life is it lawful to speak falsely;’” therefore, when Liguori approves any actions that seem opposed to truthfulness, “he allows the instances because they are not falsehood."[1] On the other hand, Jeremy Taylor squarely asserts:  “It is lawful to tell a lie to children or to madmen, because they, having no powers of judging, have no right to the truth."[2]

[Footnote 1:  See Meyrick’s Moral Theology of the Church of Rome, Appendix, p. 256 f.]

[Footnote 2:  Jeremy Taylor’s Ductor Dubitantium, in his Works, X., 103.]

But Jeremy Taylor’s trouble is in his indefinite definition of “a lie,” and in his consequent confusion of mind and of statement with reference to the limitations of the duty of veracity.  He writes on this subject at considerable length,[1] and in alternation declares himself plainly first on one side, and then on the other, of the main question, without even an attempt at logical consistency.  He starts out with the idea that “we are to endeavor to be like God, who is truth essentially;” that “God speaks truth because it is his nature;” that “the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament do indefinitely and severely forbid lying,” and “our blessed Saviour condemns it by declaring every lie to be of the Devil;” and that “beyond these things nothing can [could] be said for the condemnation of lying.”  All that certainly is explicit and sound,—­as sound as Basil the Great, as St. Augustine, or as Thomas Aquinas!

[Footnote 1:  Jeremy Taylor’s Ductor Dubitantium, in his Works, X., 100-132.]

When he attempts the definition of a lie, however, Jeremy Taylor would seem to claim that injustice toward others and an evil motive are of its very essence, and that, if these be lacking, a lie is not a lie.  “Lying is to be understood to be something said or written to the hurt of a neighbor, which cannot be understood [by the hearer or reader] otherwise than to differ from the mind of him that speaks.”  As Melanchthon says, “To lie is to deceive our neighbor to his hurt.”  “If a lie be unjust, it can never become lawful; but if it can be separate from injustice, then it may be innocent.”