We may, or we may not, be responsible for the obvious results of our action; and the moral measure of any action depends on the measure of our responsibility in the premises.  A surgeon, who is engaged in an important and critical operation, is told that he is wanted elsewhere in a case of life and death.  If he sees it to be his duty to continue where he is because he cannot safely leave this case at this time, he obviously is not responsible for results which come because of his absence from the side of the other sufferer.  A man is by a river bank when a boy is sinking before his eyes.  If the man were to reach out his arms to him, the boy might be saved.  But the man makes no movement in the boy’s behalf, and the boy drowns.  It might seem as though that man were responsible for that boy’s death; but when it is known that the man is at that moment occupied in saving the life of his own son, who is also struggling in the water, it will have to be admitted that the father is not responsible for the results of his inaction in another sphere than that which is for the moment the sphere of his imperative duty.

If a wife and mother has to choose between her loving ministry to her sick husband and to her sick child, and she chooses that which she sees to be the more important duty of the hour, she is not responsible for any results that follow from her inability to be in two places at the same time.  A man with a limited income may know that ten families are in need of money, while he can give help to only two of them.  Even though others starve while he is supplying food to all whom he can aid, he is not responsible for results that flow from his decision to limit his ministry to his means.

In all our daily life, our decision to do the one duty of the hour involves our refusal to do what is not our duty, and we have no responsibility for the results which come from such a refusal.  So in the matter of the duty of concealment, if a man simply purposes the concealment from another of that which the other has no right to know, and does not specifically affirm by word or act that which is not true, nor deny by act or word that which is true, he is in no degree responsible for the self-deception by another concerning a point which is no proper concern of that other person.

Others are self-deceived with reference to us in many things, beyond our responsibility or knowledge.  We may be considered weaker or stronger, wiser or more simple, younger or older, gladder or sadder, than we are; but for the self-deception on that point by the average observer we are not responsible.  We may not even be aware of it.  It is really no concern of ours—­or of our neighbor’s.  It is merely an incident of human life as it is.  We may have an aching tooth or an aching heart, and yet refrain from disclosing this fact in the expression of our face.  In such a case we merely conceal what is our own possession from those who have no claim to know it.  Even though they deceive themselves as to our condition in consequence of our looks, we are not responsible for their self-deception, because they are not possessed of all the facts, nor have they any right to them, nor yet to a fixed opinion in the case.