It is unnecessary to dwell on the final contest of Caesar with the nobles, with Pompey at their head, since nothing is more familiar in history.  Plainly he was not here rendering public services, as he did in Spain and Gaul, but taking care of his own interests.  I cannot see how a civil war was a service, unless it were a service to destroy the aristocratic constitution and substitute imperialism, which some think was needed with the vast extension of the Empire, and for the good administration of the provinces,—­robbed and oppressed by the governors whom the Senate had sent out to enrich the aristocracy.  It may have been needed for the better administration of justice, for the preservation of law and order, and a more efficient central power.  Absolutism may have proved a benefit to the Empire, as it proved a benefit to France under Cardinal Richelieu, when he humiliated the nobles.  If so, it was only a choice of evils, for absolutism is tyranny, and tyranny is not a blessing, except in a most demoralized state of society, which it is claimed was the state of Rome at the time of the usurpation of Caesar.  It is certain that the whole united strength of the aristocracy could not prevail over Caesar, although it had Pompey for its defender, with his immense prestige and experience as a general.

After Caesar had crossed the Rubicon, and it was certain he would march to Rome and seize the reins of government, the aristocracy fled precipitately to Pompey’s wing at Capua, fearing to find in Caesar another Marius.  Pompey did not show extraordinary ability in the crisis.  He had no courage and no purpose.  He fled to Brundusium, where ships were waiting to transport his army to Durazzo.  He was afraid to face his rival in Italy.  Caesar would have pursued, but had no navy.  He therefore went to Rome, which he had not seen for ten years, took what money he wanted from the treasury, and marched to Spain, where the larger part of Pompey’s army, under his lieutenants, were now arrayed against him.  These it was necessary first to subdue.  But Caesar prevailed, and all Spain was soon at his feet.  His successes were brilliant; and Gaul, Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia were wholly his own, as well as Spain, which was Pompey’s province.  He then rapidly returned to Rome, was named Dictator, and as such controlled the consular election, and was chosen Consul.  But Pompey held the East, and, with his ships, controlled the Mediterranean, and was gathering forces for the invasion of Italy.  Caesar allowed himself but eleven days in Rome.  It was necessary to meet Pompey before that general could return to Italy.  It was mid-winter,—­about a year after he had crossed the Rubicon.  He had with him only thirty thousand men, but these were veterans.  Pompey had nine full Roman legions, which lay at Durazzo, opposite to Brundusium, besides auxiliaries and unlimited means; but he was hampered by senatorial civilians, and his legions were only used to Eastern warfare.  He also controlled the