of the property of children was also gradually relaxed.
Under Augustus, the son could keep absolute possession
of what he had acquired in war; under Constantine,
he could retain any property acquired in the civil
service, and all property inherited from the mother
could also be retained. In later times, a father
could not give his son or daughter to another by adoption
without their consent. Thus this
patria potestas
was gradually relaxed as civilization advanced, though
it remained a peculiarity of Roman law to the latest
times, and was severer than is ever seen in the modern
world. Fathers were bound to maintain their children
when they had no separate means to supply their wants,
and children were also bound to maintain their parents
if in want. These reciprocal duties, creditable
to the Roman lawgivers, are recognized in the French
Code, but not in the English, which also recognizes
the right of a father to bequeath his whole estate
to strangers,—a thing which Roman fathers
had not power to do. The age when children attained
majority among the Romans was twenty-five years.
Women were condemned to the perpetual tutelage of parents,
husbands, or guardians, as it was supposed they never
could attain to the age of reason and experience.
The relation of guardian and ward was strictly observed
by the Romans. They made a distinction between
the right to govern a person and the right to manage
his estate, although the tutor or guardian could do
both. If the pupil was an infant, the tutor could
act without the intervention of the pupil; if the pupil
was above seven years of age, he was considered to
have an imperfect will. The youth ceased to be
a pupil, if a boy, at fourteen; if a girl, at twelve.
The tutor managed the estate of the pupil, but was
liable for loss occasioned by bad management.
He could sell movable property when expedient, but
not real estate, without judicial authority. The
tutor named by the father was preferred to all others.
The Institutes of Justinian pass from persons to things,
or the law relating to real rights; in other words,
that which pertains to property. Some things
common to all, like air, light, the ocean, and things
sacred, like temples and churches, are not classed
as property.
Two things were required for the transfer of property,
for it is the essence of property that the owner of
a thing should have the right to transfer it,—first,
the consent of the owner to transfer the thing upon
some just ground; and secondly, the actual delivery
of the thing to the person who is to acquire it.
Movables were presumed to be the property of the possessors,
until positive evidence was produced to the contrary.
A prescriptive title to movables was acquired by possession
for one year, and to immovables by possession for
two years. Undisturbed possession for thirty
years constituted in general a valid title.