In the afternoon of the same day (January 7), on which I informed the Colonel of the impossibility of harmonizing and uniting the two plans, President Wilson held a conference with the American Commissioners during which he declared that he considered the affirmative guaranty absolutely necessary to the preservation of future peace and the only effective means of preventing war.  Before this declaration could be discussed M. Clemenceau was announced and the conference came to an end.  While the President did not refer in any way to the “self-denying covenant” which I had proposed as a substitute, it seemed to me that he intended it to be understood that the substitute was rejected, and that he had made the declaration with that end in view.  This was the nearest approach to an answer to my letter of December 23 that I ever received.  Indirect as it was the implication was obvious.

Although the settled purpose of the President to insist on his form of mutual guaranty was discouraging and his declaration seemed to be intended to close debate on the subject, I felt that no effort should be spared to persuade him to change his views or at least to leave open an avenue for further consideration.  Impelled by this motive I gave to the President the articles which I had drafted and asked him if he would be good enough to read them and consider the principles on which they were based.  The President with his usual courtesy of manner smilingly received them.  Whether or not he ever read them I cannot state positively because he never mentioned them to me or, to my knowledge, to any one else.  I believe, however, that he did read them and realized that they were wholly opposed to the theory which he had evolved, because from that time forward he seemed to assume that I was hostile to his plan for a League of Nations.  I drew this conclusion from the fact that he neither asked my advice as to any provision of the Covenant nor discussed the subject with me personally.  In many little ways he showed that he preferred to have me direct my activities as a Commissioner into other channels and to keep away from the subject of a League.  The conviction that my counsel was unwelcome to Mr. Wilson was, of course, not formed at the time that he received the articles drafted by me.  It only developed after some time had elapsed, during which incidents took place that aroused a suspicion which finally became a conviction.  Possibly I was over-sensitive as to the President’s treatment of my communications to him.  Possibly he considered my advice of no value, and, therefore, unworthy of discussion.  But, in view of his letter of February 11, 1920, it must be admitted that he recognized that I was reluctant in accepting certain of his views at Paris, a recognition which arose from my declared opposition to them.  Except in the case of the Shantung settlement, there was none concerning which our judgments were so at variance as they were concerning the League of Nations.  I cannot believe, therefore, that I was wrong in my conclusion as to his attitude.