have welcomed it, for we would have been well rid of a government with such imperial designs.  But she would not have gone.  She would have submitted.  She has attained a high place in world councils.  Her astute statesmen would never have abandoned her present exalted position even for the sake of Kiao-Chau.  The whole affair assumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President, acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became the cat’s-paw.

“I have no doubt that the President fully believed that the League of Nations was in jeopardy and that to save it he was compelled to subordinate every other consideration.  The result was that China was offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of Japan.  When you get down to facts the threats were nothing but ‘bluff.’

“I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair.  I am heartsick over it, because I see how much good-will and regard the President is bound to lose.  I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics.  There seems to be none.”

It is manifest, from the foregoing recital of events leading up to the decision in regard to the Shantung Question and the apparent reasons for the President’s agreement to support the Japanese claims, that we radically differed as to the decision which was embodied in Articles 156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles (see Appendix VI, p. 318).  I do not think that we held different opinions as to the justice of the Chinese position, though probably the soundness of the legal argument in favor of the extinguishment of the German rights appealed more strongly to me than it did to Mr. Wilson.  Our chief differences were, first, that it was more important to insure the acceptance of the Covenant of the League of Nations than to do strict justice to China; second, that the Japanese withdrawal from the Conference would prevent the formation of the League; and, third, that Japan would have withdrawn if her claims had been denied.  As to these differences our opposite views remained unchanged after the Treaty of Versailles was signed.

When I was summoned before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on August 6, 1919, I told the Committee that, in my opinion, the Japanese signatures would have been affixed to the Treaty containing the Covenant even though Shantung had not been delivered over to Japan, and that the only reason that I had yielded was because it was my duty to follow the decision of the President of the United States.

About two weeks later, August 19, the President had a conference at the White House with the same Committee.  In answer to questions regarding the Shantung Settlement, Mr. Wilson said concerning my statement that his judgment was different from mine, that in his judgment the signatures could not have been obtained if he had not given Shantung to Japan, and that he had been notified that the Japanese delegates had been instructed not to sign the Treaty unless the cession of the German rights in Shantung to Japan was included.