of going.  He may, too, have felt that my opposition arose from a selfish desire to become the head of the American Commission.  From that time forward any suggestion or advice volunteered by me was seemingly viewed with suspicion.  It was, however, long after this incident that I began to feel that the President was imputing to me improper motives and crediting me with disloyalty to him personally, an attitude which was as unwarranted as it was unjust.

The President having determined to go to Paris, it seemed almost useless to urge him not to become a delegate in view of the fact that he had named but four Commissioners, although it had been arranged that the Great Powers should each have five delegates in the Conference.  This clearly indicated that the President was at least considering sitting as the fifth member of the American group.  At the same time it seemed that, if he did not take his place in the Conference as a delegate, he might retain in a measure his superior place of influence even though he was in Paris.  Four days after the Commission landed at Brest I had a long conference with Colonel House on matters pertaining to the approaching negotiations, during which he informed me that there was a determined effort being made by the European statesmen to induce the President to sit at the peace table and that he was afraid that the President was disposed to accede to their wishes.  This information indicated that, while the President had come to Paris prepared to act as a delegate, he had, after discussing the subject with the Colonel and possibly with others, become doubtful as to the wisdom of doing so, but that through the pressure of his foreign colleagues he was turning again to the favorable view of personal participation which he had held before he left the United States.

In my conversation with Colonel House I told him my reasons for opposing the President’s taking an active part in the Conference and explained to him the embarrassment that I felt in advising the President to adopt a course which would make me the head of the American Commission.  I am sure that the Colonel fully agreed with me that it was impolitic for Mr. Wilson to become a delegate, but whether he actively opposed the plan I do not know, although I believe that he did.  It was some days before the President announced that he would become the head of the American Commission.  I believe that he did this with grave doubts in his own mind as to the wisdom of his decision, and I do not think that any new arguments were advanced during those days which materially affected his judgment.

This delay in reaching a final determination as to a course of action was characteristic of Mr. Wilson.  There is in his mentality a strange mixture of positiveness and indecision which is almost paradoxical.  It is a peculiarity which it is hard to analyze and which has often been an embarrassment in the conduct of public affairs.  Suddenness rather than promptness has always marked his decisions.  Procrastination in announcing a policy or a programme makes cooeperation difficult and not infrequently defeats the desired purpose.  To put off a decision to the last moment is a trait of Mr. Wilson’s character which has caused much anxiety to those who, dealing with matters of vital importance, realized that delay was perilous if not disastrous.