For a week after this interview I heard nothing from the President on the subject, though the fact that no steps were taken to prepare written instructions for the American Commissioners convinced me that he intended to follow his original intention.  My fears were confirmed.  On the evening of Monday, November 18, the President came to my residence and told me that he had finally decided to go to the Peace Conference and that he had given out to the press an announcement to that effect.  In view of the publicity given to his decision it would have been futile to have attempted to dissuade him from his purpose.  He knew my opinion and that it was contrary to his.

After the President departed I made a note of the interview, in which among other things I wrote: 

“I am convinced that he is making one of the greatest mistakes of his career and will imperil his reputation.  I may be in error and hope that I am, but I prophesy trouble in Paris and worse than trouble here.  I believe the President’s place is here in America.”

Whether the decision of Mr. Wilson was wise and whether my prophecy was unfulfilled, I leave to the judgment of others.  His visit to Europe and its consequences are facts of history.  It should be understood that the incident is not referred to here to justify my views or to prove that the President was wrong in what he did.  The reference is made solely because it shows that at the very outset there was a decided divergence of judgment between us in regard to the peace negotiations.

While this difference of opinion apparently in no way affected our cordial relations, I cannot but feel, in reviewing this period of our intercourse, that my open opposition to his attending the Conference was considered by the President to be an unwarranted meddling with his personal affairs and was none of my business.  It was, I believe, the beginning of his loss of confidence in my judgment and advice, which became increasingly marked during the Paris negotiations.  At the time, however, I did not realize that my honest opinion affected the President in the way which I now believe that it did.  It had always been my practice as Secretary of State to speak to him with candor and to disagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision in regard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs.  There was a general belief that Mr. Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick to resent any opposition however well founded.  I had not found him so during the years we had been associated.  Except in a few instances he listened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavored to value them correctly.  If, however, the matter related even remotely to his personal conduct he seemed unwilling to debate the question.  My conclusion is that he considered his going to the Peace Conference was his affair solely and that he viewed my objections as a direct criticism of him personally for thinking