The Peace Negotiations eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 291 pages of information about The Peace Negotiations.

The Peace Negotiations eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 291 pages of information about The Peace Negotiations.

While the propaganda went forward in Italy with increasing energy, additional assurances, I was informed by one of the Italian group, were given to Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that President Wilson was almost on the point of conceding the justice of the Italian claim to Fiume.  It was not until the latter part of March, 1919, that these statesmen began to suspect that they had been misinformed and that the influence of their American friends was not as powerful with Mr. Wilson as they had been led to believe.  It was an unpleasant awakening.  They were placed in a difficult position.  Too late to calm the inflamed temper of the Italian people the Italian leaders at Paris had no alternative but to press their demands with greater vigor since the failure to obtain Fiume meant almost inevitable disaster to the Orlando Ministry.

Following conversations with Baron Sonnino and some others connected with the Italian delegation, I drew the conclusion that they would go so far as to refuse to make peace with Germany unless the Adriatic Question was first settled to their satisfaction.  In a memorandum dated March 29, I wrote:  “This will cause a dangerous crisis,” and in commenting on the probable future of the subject I stated: 

“My fear is that the President will continue to rely upon private interviews and his powers of persuasion to induce the Italians to abandon their extravagant claim.  I am sure that he will not be able to do it.  On the contrary, his conversations will strengthen rather than weaken Italian determination.  He ought to tell them now that he will not consent to have Fiume given to Italy.  It would cause anger and bitterness, but nothing to compare with the resentment which will be aroused if the uncertainty is permitted to go on much longer.  I shall tell the President my opinion at the first opportunity. [I did this a few days later.]
“The future is darkened by the Adriatic situation and I look to an explosion before the matter is settled.  It is a good thing that the President visited Italy when he did and when blessings rather than curses greeted him.  Secret diplomacy is reaping a new harvest of execrations and condemnations.  Will the practice ever cease?”

During the first three weeks of April the efforts to shake the determination of the President to support the Jugo-Slav claims to Fiume and the adjacent territory were redoubled, but without avail.  Every form of compromise as to boundary and port privileges, which did not deprive Italy of the sovereignty, was proposed, but found to be unacceptable.  The Italians, held by the pressure of the aroused national spirit, and the President, firm in the conviction that the Italian claim to the port was unjust, remained obdurate.  Attempts were made by both sides to reach some common ground for an agreement, but none was found.  As the time approached to submit the Treaty to the German plenipotentiaries, who were expected to arrive at

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The Peace Negotiations from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.