A practical view of the situation so clearly pointed to the unwisdom of the President’s personal participation in the peace negotiations that a very probable explanation for his determination to be present at the Conference is the assumption that the idea had become so firmly embedded in his mind that nothing could dislodge it or divert him from his purpose.  How far the spectacular feature of a President crossing the ocean to control in person the making of peace appealed to him I do not know.  It may have been the deciding factor.  It may have had no effect at all.  How far the belief that a just peace could only be secured by the exercise of his personal influence over the delegates I cannot say.  How far he doubted the ability of the men whom he proposed to name as plenipotentiaries is wholly speculative.  Whatever plausible reason may be given, the true reason will probably never be known.

Not appreciating, at the time that Colonel House informed me of the President’s plan to be present at the Conference, that the matter had gone as far as it had, and feeling very strongly that it would be a grave mistake for the President to take part in person in the negotiations, I felt it to be my duty, as his official adviser in foreign affairs and as one desirous to have him adopt a wise course, to state plainly to him my views.  It was with hesitation that I did this because the consequence of the non-attendance of the President would be to make me the head of the American Peace Commission at Paris.  There was the danger that my motive in opposing the President’s attending the Conference would be misconstrued and that I might be suspected of acting from self-interest rather than from a sense of loyalty to my chief.  When, however, the armistice went into effect and the time arrived for completing the personnel of the American Commission, I determined that I ought not to remain silent.

The day after the cessation of hostilities, that is, on November 12, I made the following note: 

“I had a conference this noon with the President at the White House in relation to the Peace Conference.  I told him frankly that I thought the plan for him to attend was unwise and would be a mistake.  I said that I felt embarrassed in speaking to him about it because it would leave me at the head of the delegation, and I hoped that he understood that I spoke only out of a sense of duty.  I pointed out that he held at present a dominant position in the world, which I was afraid he would lose if he went into conference with the foreign statesmen; that he could practically dictate the terms of peace if he held aloof; that he would be criticized severely in this country for leaving at a time when Congress particularly needed his guidance; and that he would be greatly embarrassed in directing domestic affairs from overseas.”

I also recorded as significant that the President listened to my remarks without comment and turned the conversation into other channels.