give to the war-stricken peoples of Europe opportunity to resume their normal industrial life seemed to me the first and greatest task to be accomplished.  It was in my judgment superior to every other object of the Paris negotiations.  Compared with it the creation of a League of Nations was insignificant and could well be postponed.  President Wilson thought otherwise.  We were very far apart in this matter as he well knew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions with reluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern.

As a matter of interest in this connection and as a possible source from which the President may have acquired knowledge of my views as to the conduct of the negotiations, I would call attention again to the conference which I had with Colonel House on December 17, 1918, and to which I have referred in connection with the subject of international arbitration.  During that conference I said to the Colonel “that I thought that there ought to be a preliminary treaty of peace negotiated without delay, and that all the details as to a League of Nations, boundaries, and indemnities should wait for the time being.  The Colonel replied that he was not so sure about delaying the creation of a League, as he was afraid that it never could be put through unless it was done at once.  I told him that possibly he was right, but that I was opposed to anything which delayed the peace.”  This quotation is from my memorandum made at the time of our conversation.  I think that the same reason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced the course of the President.  My impression at the time was that the Colonel favored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it the full plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to be impracticable.

There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programme prepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been a preliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed the negotiations as to a League.  Possibly the President realized that this danger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason was unwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty be drawn.  At least it may have added another reason for his proceeding without advising the Commissioners of his purposes.

As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took place at Paris, President Wilson’s inherent dislike to depart in the least from an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems to me to have been the most potent influence in determining his method of work during the Peace Conference.  He seemed to think that, having marked out a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would show intellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose.  Even when there could be no doubt that in view of changed conditions it was wise to change a policy, which he had openly adopted or approved, he clung to it with peculiar