II
In connection with the present writer’s expressed opinion regarding the relative practical value of regulars and volunteers in modern warfare, the following excerpt from the Chicago Record of November 3, 1898, is worth reading.
Captain Avid Wester, the Swedish officer who accompanied the American army in Cuba, in order to study the war, has just returned to Sweden. During his stay in Gothenburg he was interviewed, and he seems now to have a more sympathetic view of the Americans—the volunteers excepted—than former reports indicated. Captain Wester greatly praised the treatment he had received from all the American officers, and the bravery of the Americans in the regular army. “Of the 18,000 men under the command of General Shafter,” he says, “only 4,000 were volunteers or militiamen; the rest consisted of regulars, which had had an average service of six years on the borders of the Indian territory. They were very good and well-disciplined soldiers, who went into battle with complete disregard of death. The militia regiments, however, could not be got within range of the Spanish bullets, and all the stories about the heroism of volunteers are untrue. The only volunteers who distinguished themselves were the ‘rough riders,’ who, in spite of their name, fought on foot, but these men were not a militia regiment. The troop consisted of cowboys and adventurers, who cared neither for life nor death, but rushed blindly into battle. Brave fellows withal.” After praising the bravery of the Spaniards and the accuracy of their fire, Captain Wester expresses the belief that with modern rifles in use it is of the greatest importance to have well-trained soldiers, who in the heat of battle retain their coolness and listen to their officers’ directions and commands,—in a word, soldiers who retain good firing discipline. This, he says, cannot be expected of men with short time of training, on whom the din of battle often has so paralyzing an effect that the soldier can neither hear nor see.
III
The question concerning the quality of the beef served as a ration to our troops during the recent war—in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and aboard the transports—has already been pretty thoroughly answered, one way or the other. Yet, though the topic is worn nearly threadbare and admittedly has nothing in particular to do with General Schwan’s campaign, I venture to make, in this place, a personal contribution to the discussion in the form of an extract from a letter, written by me from Mayaguez on September 15, 1898.
Our rations [on the transport “Comanche”] consisted of hard tack, coffee, canned baked-beans, canned tomatoes, and canned “roast beef.” Before we arrived at Key West the baked-beans had all been eaten and the water in the tanks had gone rotten—we carried no condenser—so that we were reduced to the rather monotonous diet of tomatoes for breakfast, tomatoes and canned roast beef for dinner, and tomatoes again for supper; with a full allowance of coffee and hard tack at all three meals.