At about this time our advice was sought by the United States Navy Department as to the best type of anti-submarine craft for the United States to build; on this subject a very short experience in the war theatre caused Admiral Sims to hold precisely similar views to myself.  As a result of the advice tendered a great building programme of destroyers, large submarine-hunting motor launches and other small craft was embarked upon.  Although the completion of these vessels was delayed considerably beyond anticipated dates, they did, in 1918, exercise an influence on the submarine war.

The Germans made one great mistake, for which we were thankful.  As already mentioned, it was anticipated that they would send submarines to work off the United States coast immediately after the declaration of war by that country.  Indeed we were expecting to hear of the presence of submarines in the West Atlantic throughout the whole of 1917.  They did not appear there until May, 1918.  The moral effect of such action in 1917 would have been very great and might possibly have led to the retention in the United States of some of the destroyers and other small craft which were of such assistance in European waters in starting the convoy system.  Admiral Sims was himself, I think, anxious on this head.  When the Germans did move in this direction in 1918 it was too late; it was by that time realized in the United States that the enemy could not maintain submarines in sufficient numbers in their waters to exercise any decisive effect, although the shipping losses might be considerable for a time, and consequently no large change of policy was made.

As is well known, Admiral Sims, with the consent of the United States Navy Department, placed all vessels which were dispatched to British waters under the British flag officers in whose Command they were working.  This step, which at once produced unity of command, is typical of the manner in which the two navies, under the guidance of their senior officers, worked together throughout the war.  The destroyers operating from Queenstown came under Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly; Captain Pringle, the senior United States officer on the spot, whose services were ever of the utmost value, was appointed as Chief of the Staff to Sir Lewis Bayly, whilst on the occasion of Sir Lewis Bayly, at my urgent suggestion, consenting to take a few days’ leave in the summer of 1917, Admiral Sims, at our request, took his place at Queenstown, hoisting his flag in command of the British and United States naval forces.  The relations between the officers and men of the two navies in this Command were of the happiest possible nature, and form one of the pleasantest episodes of the co-operation between the two nations.  The United States officers and men very quickly realized the strong personality of the Commander-in-Chief at Queenstown, and became imbued with the same feelings of great respect and admiration for him as were held