he informed me that an idea was prevalent in the United States that the morale of the German submarine crews had been completely broken by their losses in submarines.  This impression was the successful result of certain action on our part taken with intent to discourage the enemy.  Whatever may have been the case later in the year, we had, however, no evidence in the spring of 1917 of deterioration of morale amongst German submarine crews, nor was there any reason for such a result.  It was therefore necessary to be quite frank with Admiral Sims; we knew quite well that we could not expect new measures to be effective for some few months, and we knew also that we could not afford a continuance of the heavy rate of loss experienced in April, without a serious effect being produced upon our war effort.  We were certainly not in the state of panic which has been ascribed to us in certain quarters, but we did want those who were engaged in the war on the side of the Allies to understand the situation in order that they might realize the value that early naval assistance would bring to the Allied cause.  There is no doubt that great difficulty must be experienced by those far removed from the theatre of war in understanding the conditions in the war zone.  This was exemplified at a time when we had organized the trade in convoys and the system was showing itself effective in greatly reducing losses from submarine attack.  We were pressing the United States to strengthen our escorting forces as far as possible in order to extend the convoy system, when a telegram arrived from Washington to the effect that it was considered that ships which were armed were safer when sailing singly than when in convoy.  It has also been stated that the Admiralty held the view at this time that no solution of the problem created by the enemy’s submarine campaign was in sight.  This is incorrect.  We had confidence in the measures—­most of them dependent on the manufacture of material—­which were in course of preparation by the time the United States entered the war, but our opinion was that there was no immediate solution beyond the provision of additional vessels for the protection of shipping, and the reason for this view was that time was required before other measures could be put into effective operation; this is evident from the final paragraph of my telegram to Admiral de Chair, dated April 26, which I have quoted.

The first division of six United States destroyers, under the command of Lieut.-Commander T.K.  Taussig, arrived in British waters on May 2, and they were most welcome.  It was interesting to me personally that Lieut.-Commander Taussig should be in command, as he, when a sub-lieutenant, had been wounded on the same day as myself during the Boxer campaign in China, and we had been together for some time subsequently.