The need for sloops was so great that I sent a personal telegram to Mr. Schwab, whose acquaintance I had made in October, 1914, on the occasion of the loss of the Audacious, begging him to build at once a hundred of these vessels to our order.  I felt certain from the experience we had gained of Mr. Schwab’s wonderful energy and power, as illustrated by the work accomplished by him in providing us in 1915 with ten submarines built in the extraordinarily short period of five months, that he would produce sloops at a very rapid rate and that there would be no delay in starting if he undertook the work.  The drawings had already been sent over.  However he was not able to undertake the work as the U.S.  Government decided that his yards would all be required for their own work.  This was unfortunate, as I had hoped that these vessels would have been built in from four to six months, seeing that the drawings were actually ready; they would have been invaluable in the latter part of 1917.

Whilst the mission was in the United States constant communications passed on these subjects, the heavy losses taking place in merchant ships were stated, and every effort was made to impress upon the Navy Department the urgency of the situation.

The tenor of our communications will be gathered from these quotations from a personal telegram sent by me to Admiral de Chair on April 26, viz.: 

“For Rear-Admiral de Chair from First Sea Lord.

“You must emphasize most strongly to the United States authorities the very serious nature of the shipping position.  We lost 55 British ships last week approximately 180,000 tons and rate of loss is not diminishing.

* * * * *

“Press most strongly that the number of destroyers sent to Ireland should be increased to twenty-four at once if this number is available.

“Battleships are not required but concentration on the vital question of defeat of submarine menace is essential.

“Urge on the authorities that everything should give way to the submarine menace and that by far the most important place on which to concentrate patrols is the S.W. of Ireland.

* * * * *

“You must keep constantly before the U.S. authorities the great gravity of the situation and the need that exists for immediate action.

“Our new methods will not be effective until July and the critical period is April to July.”

It was very necessary to bring home to the United States Navy Department the need for early action.  Admiral Sims informed me—­as soon as he became aware of the heavy losses to merchant shipping that were taking place—­that neither he nor anyone else in the United States had realized that the situation was so serious.  This was, of course, largely due to the necessity which we were under of not publishing facts which would encourage the enemy or unduly depress our own people.  Further,