The organizing manager of the convoys and his staff controlled the assembly, etc., of all convoys and vessels.

The routing of the convoys and their protection, both ocean and anti-submarine, was arranged under the superintendence of the A.C.N.S.

In addition to the central Admiralty organization, an officer with the necessary staff was appointed to each convoy port of assembly at home and abroad.  This officer’s duties comprised the collection and organization of the convoy and the issue of sailing orders and necessary printed instructions to the masters of the vessels, seeing that they were properly equipped for sailing in company, and forwarding information to the Admiralty of the movements of the convoy.

An essential feature of the system was the appointment of a convoy commodore.  This officer was quite distinct from the commanding officer of the vessel forming the ocean escort, but acted under his orders when in company.  The duty of the convoy commodore, whose broad pennant was hoisted in one of the ships, was, subject to instructions from the commanding officer of the escorting vessel, to take general charge of the convoy.

The convoy commodores were either naval officers, admirals or captains on the active or retired lists, or experienced merchant captains.  The duties were most arduous and responsible, but there was no lack of volunteers for this work.  Many of the convoy commodores had their ships sunk under them.  The country has every reason for much gratitude to those who undertook this difficult and very responsible task.

By July we had succeeded in increasing the strength of the anti-submarine convoy escorting force to thirty-three destroyers (eleven of which belonged to the United States Navy) and ten sloops, with eleven more destroyers for the screening of troop transports through the submarine zone and for the protection of the convoys eastward from the Lizard, the position in which the other screening force left them.  We had remaining twelve sloops, which, with trawlers, were engaged in protecting that considerable portion of the trade making for the south of Ireland, which we could not yet bring under convoy.  It was intended to absorb these sloops for convoy protection as soon as circumstances permitted.

At this stage it was considered that a total of thirty-three more destroyers or sloops was needed to complete the homeward convoy system.  The Admiralty was pressed to weaken yet further the Grand Fleet destroyer force in order to extend the convoy system, but did not consider such a course justified in view of the general naval situation.

In arranging the organization of the Atlantic convoy system it was necessary to take into consideration certain other important matters.  Amongst these were the following: 

1.  The selection of ports of assembly and frequency of sailing.  During the latter half of 1917 the general arrangements were as follows for the homeward trade: