of running a daily convoy was continued, because it was impossible to forecast the strength or exact character—­battle-cruisers, cruisers or destroyers—­of the attack; and the first step was to reduce the number of convoys and to increase correspondingly the number of ships in each convoy.  A telegram was sent to the Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands on October 26 asking whether the convoys could be conveniently reduced to three per week.  A reply was received on the 29th to the effect that the convoy could be run every third day under certain conditions; the important conditions were the use of the Tyne instead of the Hurnber as a collecting port, and the provision of eight extra trawlers and nine modern destroyers.  Sir Frederick Brock stated that he was assuming cruiser protection to the convoys and that the details would need to be worked out before the change could be made.  He suggested a conference.  He was requested on October 31 to consult the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England as to the practicability of using the Tyne as a convoy collecting port.  Meanwhile Sir F. Brock had prepared a scheme for giving effect to his proposals, and on November 5 he sent copies of this scheme to the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England and other officers concerned for their consideration.

In forwarding proposals to the Admiralty on November 22, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet stated that the destroyers asked for could not be provided from the Grand Fleet.  Amongst other reasons it was pointed out that the destroyers required for screening the light cruisers protecting the convoys would have to be supplied from that source, thus bringing an additional strain on the Grand Fleet flotillas.  He suggested the provision of these vessels from other Commands, such as the Mediterranean, and pointed out the manifest advantages that would result from providing a force for this convoy work that would be additional to the Grand Fleet flotillas.  Consideration of the proposals at the Admiralty showed once again the great difficulty of providing the destroyers.  It was impossible to spare any from the Mediterranean, where large troop movements needing destroyer protection were in progress, and other Commands were equally unable to furnish them.  Indeed, the demands for destroyers from all directions were as insistent as ever.  The unsuitability of the Tyne as a collecting port was remarked upon by the Naval Staff, as well as other objections to the scheme as put forward from Scapa.  In order to decide upon a workable scheme, directions were given that a conference was to assemble at Scapa on December 10.  An officer from the Naval Staff was detailed to attend the conference, to point out the objections which had been raised and, amongst other matters, to bring to notice the advantage of the Firth of Forth as a collecting port instead of the Tyne.

Meanwhile steps had been taken to furnish as much protection as possible from Grand Fleet resources to the convoys against attack by enemy surface vessels.