The first attack took place at daylight on October 17.  The convoy on this occasion consisted of twelve ships, two British, one Belgian, one Danish, five Norwegian and three Swedish, and was under the anti-submarine escort of the destroyers Mary Rose and Strongbow, and two trawlers, the Elsie and P.  Fannon.  At dawn, shortly after 6.0 A.M., two strange vessels were sighted to the southward, and were later recognized as German light cruisers.  They were challenged, but replied by opening fire at about 6.15 A.M., disabling the Strongbow with the first salvo fired.  The Mary Rose steamed gallantly at the enemy with the intention of attacking with torpedoes, but was sunk by gunfire before she could achieve her object.  The enemy vessels then attacked the convoy, sinking all except the British and Belgian vessels, which escaped undamaged.  The Strongbow, shelled at close range, returned the fire, using guns and torpedoes, but was completely overwhelmed by the guns of the light cruisers and sank at about 9.30 A.M.  The trawler Elsie effected very fine rescue work amongst the survivors both from the Strongbow and ships of the convoy, whilst under fire, and both trawlers reached Lerwick.  The enemy sheered off soon after 8.0 A.M.  Most unfortunately neither the Strongbow nor the Mary Rose succeeded in getting a wireless signal through to our own vessels to report the presence of enemy ships, otherwise there can be little doubt that they would have been intercepted and sunk.  We had in the North Sea, during the night before the attack and during the day of the attack, a particularly strong force of light cruisers comprising four or possibly five squadrons (a total of not less than sixteen vessels), all to the southward of the convoy route, and had the information of the attack come through from the destroyers, these vessels would have been informed at once and would have had an excellent chance of intercepting the enemy.  The extreme difficulty of preventing the egress of raiders from the North Sea at night, even when so large a force is cruising, was well illustrated by this incident, although a little reflection on the wide area of water to be covered, together with a knowledge of the distance that the eye can cover on a dark night (some 200 to 300 yards), would show how very great are the chances in favour of evasion.

This disaster to the Scandinavian convoy was bound to bring into prominence the question of affording to it protection against future attacks by surface vessels, for necessarily the protection against surface vessels differed from that against submarines, a point which was sometimes overlooked by those who were unfamiliar with the demands of the two wars which were being waged—­the one on the surface and the other under the surface.  It was very difficult to furnish efficient protection against the surface form of attack from the resources of the Grand Fleet if the practice