[Footnote B:  Includes United States destroyers.]

There was the possible alternative of bringing only a small portion of the trade under convoy by taking all the available fast small craft from patrol duty and utilizing them to escort this portion of the trade, but it was felt that as this would leave the whole of the remaining trade entirely without protection, and no fast patrol craft would be on the trade routes to pick up the crews of any merchant ships that might be sunk by submarines, the step was not justified.

The next point for consideration was the possibility of obtaining destroyers or sloops from other sources with which to increase the forces for trade protection.  The only commands on which it was possible to draw further were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces, the destroyers of old types working on the East Coast, or the destroyers and “P” boats protecting our cross-Channel communications west of the Dover Command.

It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or Dover flotillas materially, as we were already running the gravest risks from the inadequacy of these forces to deal with enemy destroyers and submarines operating in southern waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports, and in addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole protection for the weekly convoy running between the Thames and Dutch ports, besides being much required for reconnaissance and offensive operations in the Heligoland Bight so far as it could be spared for this purpose.  However, the emergency was such that destroyers were taken from Harwich, as the force obtained new vessels of a faster and more powerful type.  The destroyers on the East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were already inadequate to afford proper protection to the trade and the cross-Channel communications, as evidenced by our losses.  Here again, however, in order to meet the very serious situation, some destroyers were eventually transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the expense of still less protection and fewer opportunities for offensive action against submarines.  There remained only the Grand Fleet destroyers on which we could draw yet further.  It had always been held that the Grand Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders for the double purpose of screening the ships from submarine attack when at sea and of countering the enemy’s destroyers and attacking his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action.  We had gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Fleet up to this figure by the early spring of 1917, although, of course, it fell far short of requirements in earlier months.  It was well known to us that the High Sea Fleet would be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or eighty-eight destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its selected moment, and it was quite probable that the number might be much higher, as many more vessels were available.  At our average moment, even with a nominal