It is the height of economic folly to stint experimental research, for it is in times of stress that the value of past experimental work is shown.  In the matter of organization we must be certain that adequate means are taken to ensure that the different arms which must co-operate in war are trained to work together under peace conditions.  A modern fleet consists of many units of different types—­battleships, battle-cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers and submarines.  Before I relinquished the command of the Grand Fleet, large sea-going submarines of high speed, vessels of the “K” class, had been built to accompany the surface vessels to sea.  It is very essential that senior officers should have every opportunity of studying tactical schemes in which various classes of ships and kinds of weapons are employed.  In considering the future of the Navy it is impossible to ignore aircraft.  There are many important problems which the Navy and the Air Service ought to work out together.  A fleet without aircraft will be a fleet without eyes, and aircraft will, moreover, be necessary, not only for reconnaissance work, but for gun-spotting, as well as, possibly, for submarine hunting.  Air power is regarded by many officers of wide practical experience as an essential complement to sea power, whatever future the airship and aeroplane may have for independent action.  A captain who is going to fight his ship successfully must have practised in time of peace with all the weapons he will employ in action, and he must have absolute control over all the elements constituting the fighting power of his ship.  In a larger sense, the same may be said of an admiral in command of a fleet; divided control may mean disaster.  The advent of aircraft has introduced new and, at present, only partially explored problems into naval warfare, and officers commanding naval forces will require frequent opportunities of studying them.  They must be worked out with naval vessels and aircraft acting in close association.  With the Air Service under separate control, financially as well as in an executive and administrative sense, is it certain that the Admiralty will be able to obtain machines and personnel in the necessary numbers to carry out all the experimental and training work that is essential for efficiency in action?  Is it also beyond doubt that unity of command at sea, which is essential to victory, will be preserved?  In view of all the possibilities which the future holds now that the airship and aeroplane have arrived, it is well that there should be no doubt on such matters, for inefficiency might in conceivable circumstances spell defeat.

Then there is the question of the personnel of the fleet.  It would be most unwise to allow the strength of the trained personnel of the Navy to fall below the limit of reasonable safety, because it is upon that trained personnel that the success of the enormous expansions needed in war so largely depends.  This was found during the late struggle, when the personnel was expanded from 150,000 to upwards of 400,000, throwing upon the pre-war nucleus a heavy responsibility in training, equipment and organizing.  Without the backbone of a highly trained personnel of sufficient strength, developments in time of sudden emergency cannot possibly be effected.  In the late war we suffered in this respect, and we should not forget the lesson.