Class of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months ---------------------------------
----------------------------------- Minesweepers | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 Trawlers |25 |18 |23 |14 |30 |13 |27 |28 |33 |24 | 41 ----------------------------------------
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It will be seen from these figures that the forecast of June was inaccurate even for the three succeeding months and that the total deficit in the five months was considerable, except in the case of T.B.D.’s and “P” boats.

The most disappointing figures were those relating to submarines, trawlers and minesweepers.  The case of the submarines may be put in another way, thus: 

In the June forecast twenty-six submarines were forecasted for delivery during the period July to the end of December, the dates of three, however, being somewhat uncertain; of this total of twenty-six, only nine were actually delivered.  Of the remainder, seven were shown in a November forecast as delayed for four months, two for five months, and one for nine months.

The attention of the Production Departments was continually directed to the very serious effect which the delay was producing on our anti-submarine measures, and the First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, was informed of the difficult position which was arising.  In the early part of December I pointed out to the Third Sea Lord and the Admiralty Controller, Sir Allan Anderson, that it was obviously impossible for the Naval Staff to frame future policy unless some dependence could be placed on the forecast of deliveries.  The Controller in reply stated that accurate forecasts were most difficult, and proposed a discussion with the Third Sea Lord and myself, but I had left the Admiralty before the discussion took place.

The delays, as will be seen from the tables given, were most serious in the case of vessels classed as auxiliaries.  Sir Thomas Bell, who possessed great experience of shipbuilding in a private capacity, was at the head of the Department of the Deputy Controller for Dockyards and Shipbuilding, and the Director of Warship Production was a distinguished Naval constructor.  The Deputy Controller of Auxiliary Shipbuilding was an officer lent from the War Office, whose previous experience had lain, I believe, largely in the railway world; some of his assistants and staff were, however, men with experience of shipbuilding.

When I became First Sea Lord at the end of 1916 the new building programme, which had received the sanction of the Cabinet, was as follows: