promise which he can’t fulfil.  The District Attorney is mistaken in this matter; at the same time, let me admit that in the management of this case he has displayed an ability beyond his years.  This is the first prosecution ever brought, so far as we can discover, on this slave-stealing statute, either in this District or in Maryland.  This statute, of the existence of which few lawyers were aware,—­I am sure I was not,—­has been waked up, after a slumber of more than a century, and brought to bear upon my client.  It is your duty to go into the examination of this novel case temperately and carefully; to take care that no man and no court, upon review of the case, shall be able to say that your verdict is not warranted by the evidence.  If the case is made out against the prisoner, convict him; but if not, as you value the reputation of the District and your own souls, beware how you give a verdict against him!

“You are not a lynch-law court.  It is no part of your business to inquire whether the prisoner has done wrong, and if so to punish him for it.  It is your sole business to inquire if he be guilty of this, special charge set forth against him in this indictment, of stealing Andrew Houver’s two slaves.  The law you are not expected to judge of; to enlighten you on that matter, we have prayed instructions from the court, and those instructions, for the purpose of this trial, are to be taken as the law.  The question for you is, Does the evidence in this case bring the prisoner within the law as laid down by the court?  To bring him within that law, you are not to go upon imagination, but upon facts proved by witnesses; and, it seems to me, you have a very plain duty before you.  This is not a thing done in a corner.  Take care that you render such a verdict that you will not be ashamed to have it set forth in letters of light, visible to all the world.

“There are two offences established by the statutes of Maryland, between which, in this case, it becomes your duty to distinguish.  Everything depends on these statutes, because without these statutes neither act is a crime.  At common law, there are no such offences as stealing slaves, or transporting slaves.  Now, which of these two acts is proved against this prisoner?  In some respects they are alike.  The carrying the slaves away, the depriving the master of their services, is common to both.  But, to constitute the stealing of slaves, according to the law as laid down by the court, there must be something more yet.  There must be a corruption of the minds of the slaves, and a seducing them to leave their masters’ service.  And does not this open a plain path for this prisoner out of the danger of this prosecution?  Where is the least evidence that the prisoner seduced these slaves, and induced them to leave their masters?  Has the District Attorney, with all his zeal, pointed out a single particle of evidence of that sort?  Has he done anything to take this case