divisions of Lheritier, Grandchamp, Goze, and Conseil-Dumenil—­formed a sort of horseshoe, turned towards Sedan, and uniting the first battle front with the second.  The cavalry division of Ameil and the brigade of Fontanges served as a reserve for these four divisions.  The whole of the artillery was upon the two battle fronts.  Two portions of the army were in confusion, one to the right of Sedan beyond Balan, the other to the left of Sedan, on this side of Iges.  Beyond Balan were the divisions of Vassoigne and the brigade of Reboul, on this side of Iges were the two cavalry divisions of Margueritte and Bonnemains.

These arrangements indicated a profound feeling of security.  In the first place the Emperor Napoleon III. would not have come there if he had not been perfectly tranquil.  This Givonne Valley is what Napoleon I. called a “washhand basin.”  There could not be a more complete enclosure.  An army is so much at home there that it is too much so; it runs the risk of no longer being able to get out.  This disquieted some brave and prudent leaders such as Wimpfen, but they were not listened to.  If absolutely necessary, said the people of the Imperial circle, they could always be sure of being able to reach Mezieres, and at the worst the Belgian frontier.  Was it, however, needful to provide for such extreme eventualities?  In certain cases foresight is almost an offence.  They were all of one mind, therefore, to be at their ease.

If they had been uneasy they would have cut the bridges of the Meuse; but they did not even think of it.  To what purpose?  The enemy was a long way off.  The Emperor, who evidently was well informed, affirmed it.

The army bivouacked somewhat in confusion, as we have said, and slept peaceably throughout this night of August 31, having, whatever might happen, or believing that they had, the retreat upon Mezieres open behind it.  They disdained to take the most ordinary precautions, they made no cavalry reconnaissances, they did not even place outposts.  A German military writer has stated this.[37] Fourteen leagues at least separated them from the German army, three days’ march; they did not exactly know where it was; they believed it scattered, possessing little unity, badly informed, led somewhat at random upon several points at once, incapable of a movement converging upon one single point, like Sedan; they believed that the Crown Prince of Saxony was marching on Chalons, and that the Crown Prince of Prussia was marching on Metz; they were ignorant of everything appertaining to this army, its leaders, its plan, its armament, its effective force.  Was it still following the strategy of Gustavus Adolphus?  Was it still following the tactics of Frederick II.?  No one knew.  They felt sure of being at Berlin in a few weeks.  What nonsense!  The Prussian army!  They talked of this war as of a dream, and of this army as of a phantom.

During this very night, while the French army was sleeping, this is what was taking place.