measures.  A navy law was passed, which has since been the foundation of all our treaties of reciprocity with England.  A protective tariff was also adopted as another means of retaliation.  In these measures, the United States, being a young nation with unlimited territory, had everything to gain, and England all to lose.  Great Britain was first to tire of restrictive measures, and, by a repeal on her part, invited a repeal on ours.

In another way Great Britain exasperated the popular feeling here against her, and even forced the American government, once or twice, to the verge of war.  By the treaty of peace, all military posts held by England within the limits of the United States were to be given up.  Michilimacinac, Detroit, Oswegotche, Point au Fer and Dutchman’s Point were long held in defiance of the compact.  These posts became the centre of intrigues among the savages of the Northwest.  Arms were here distributed to the Indians, and disturbances on the American frontier were fomented.  The war on the Miami, which was brought to a bloody close by Wayne’s victory, was, principally, the result of such secret machinations.  In short, England regarded the treaty of 1783 as a truce rather than a pacification, and long, held to the hope of being able yet to punish the colonies for their rebellion.  In two celebrated letters written by John Adams from Great Britain, he used the following decided language in reference to the secret designs of England: 

“If she can bind Holland in her shackles, and France from internal dissensions is unable to interfere, she will make war immediately against us.”  This was in 1787.  Two years before he had expressed, the same ideas.  “Their present system, as far as I can penetrate it,” he wrote, “is to maintain a determined peace with all Europe, in order that they may war singly against America, if they should think it necessary.”

A sentiment of such relentless hostility, which no attempt was made to disguise, but which was arrogantly paraded on every occasion, could not fail to exasperate those feelings of dislike on the part of America, which protracted war had engendered.  This mutual hatred between the two nations arose from the enmity of the people rather than of the cabinets, “There is too much reason to believe,” wrote our minister, “that if the nation had another hundred million to spend, they would soon force the ministry into another war with us.”  On the side of the United States, it required all the prudence of Washington, sustained by his hold on the affections of the people, to restrain them from a war with England, after that power had refused to surrender the military posts.

A third element of discord arose when England joined the coalition against France, in 1793.  The course which the former had pursued for the preceding ten years, had, as we have seen, tended to alienate the people of America from her and nourish sentiments of hostility in their bosoms.  On the other hand, France, with that address for which she is eminent, had labored to heighten the good feelings already existing between herself and the United States.  A treaty of alliance and commerce bound the two countries; but the courteous demeanor of France cemented us to her by still stronger ties, those of popular will.