To obviate the disposition which a foreign race of princes might have to trust their original subjects, it was enacted that none of them should be capable of any place of trust or profit in these kingdoms.  And to hinder our monarchs from transferring the revenues of Britain to Hanover, and enriching it with the commerce of our traders, and the labours of our husbandmen; from raising taxes to augment the splendour of a petty court, and increasing the garrisons of their mountains by misapplying that money which this nation should raise for its own defence, it was provided that the emperour of Britain should never return to his native dominions, but reside always in this kingdom, without any other care than that of gaining the affections of his British subjects, preserving their rights, and increasing their power.

It was imagined by that senate, that the electorate of Hanover, a subordinate dignity, held by custom of homage to a greater power, ought to be thought below the regard of the emperor of Britain, and that the sovereign of a nation like this ought to remember a lower state only to heighten his gratitude to the people by whom he was exalted.  They were far from imagining that Britain and Hanover would in time be considered as of equal importance, and that their sovereign would divide his years between one country and the other, and please himself with exhibiting in Hanover the annual show of the pomp and dignity of a British emperor.

This clause, sir, however, a later senate readily repealed; upon what motives I am not able to declare, having never heard the arguments which prevailed upon their predecessors to enact it, confuted or invalidated; nor have I found that the event has produced any justification of their conduct, or that the nation has received any remarkable advantage from the travels of our emperours.

There is another clause in that important act which yet the senate has not adventured to repeal, by which it is provided, that this nation shall not be engaged in war for the defence of the Hanoverian dominions; dominions of which we can have no interest in the protection or preservation; dominions, perhaps, of no great value, into whatever hands chance and negligence may throw them, which their situation has made entirely useless to a naval power; but which, though they cannot benefit, may injure us, by diverting the attention of our sovereign, or withholding his affections.

Whether this clause, sir, has not sometimes been eluded, whether the six thousand Hessians, which we once supported, were of use to any of the British dominions, and whether a double number of the same nation, now paid with our money for the defence of the queen of Hungary, have not been stationed only where they might defend Hanover, without the least advantage to our confederates; whether the nation has not been condemned to double expenses in the support of this alliance, by raising, for the queen’s service, troops, which were only employed in the protection of Hanover, and then in succouring her with pecuniary supplies, it is, perhaps, at present unnecessary, though, I hope, not yet too late, to inquire.