It may be urged, my lords, that he who shall give false evidence, forfeits the indemnity to which the honest witness is entitled; but let us consider why this should be now, rather than in any former time, accounted a sufficient security against falsehood and perjury.  It is at all times criminal, and at all times punishable, to commit perjury; and yet it has been hitherto thought necessary, not only to deter it by subsequent penalties, but to take away all previous temptations; no man’s oath will be admitted in his own cause, though offered at the hazard of the punishment inflicted upon perjury.  To offer indemnity to invite evidence, and to deter them from false accusations by the forfeiture of it, even though we should allow to the penal clause all the efficacy which can be expected by those who proposed it, is only to set one part of the bill at variance with the other, to erect and demolish at the same time.

But it may be proved, my lords, that the reward will have more influence than the penalty; and that every man who can reason upon the condition in which he is placed by this bill, will be more incited to accuse lord Orford, however unjustly, by the prospect of security, than intimidated by the forfeiture incurred by perjury.

For, let us suppose, my lords, a man whose conduct exposes him to punishment, and who knows that he shall not long be able to conceal it; what can be more apparently his interest, than to contrive such an accusation as may complicate his own wickedness with some transactions of the person to whom this bill relates?  He may, indeed, be possibly confuted, and lose the benefit offered by the state; but the loss of it will not place him in a condition more dangerous than that which he was in before; he has already deserved all the severity to which perjury will expose him, and by forging a bold and well-connected calumny, he has at least a chance of escaping.

Let us suppose, my lords, that the bill now under our consideration, assigned a pecuniary reward to any man who should appear against this person, with a clause by which he that should accuse him falsely should be dismissed without his pay; would not this appear a method of prosecution contrary to law, and reason, and justice?  Would not every man immediately discover, that the witnesses were bribed, and therefore they would deserve no credit?  And what is the difference between the advantage now offered and any other consideration, except that scarcely any other reward can be offered so great, and consequently so likely to influence?

It is to be remembered, that the patrons of this bill evidently call for testimony from the abandoned and the profligate, from men whom they suppose necessarily to confess their own crimes in their depositions; and surely wretches like these ought not to be solicited to perjury by the offer of a reward.

How cruel must all impartial spectators of the publick transactions account a prosecution like this?  What would be your lordships’ judgment, should you read, that in any distant age, or remote country, a man was condemned upon the evidence of persons publickly hired to accuse him, and who, by their own confession, were traitors to their country?