The time of such desperation is, indeed, not yet arrived; but every act of servile compliance will bring it nearer; and, therefore, my lords, for the sake of ourselves, as well as of the people, I join the noble lord’s motion for resuming the house, that farther information may be obtained both by ourselves, by the commons, and by the nation.

The duke of NEWCASTLE then rose, and spoke to the effect following:—­My lords, I believe no lord in this assembly is more zealous for the advantage of the publick than myself, or more desirous to preserve the lives, or amend the morals of the people; but I cannot think that this character can justly imply any dislike of the bill now before us.

If I should admit what the noble lord has asserted, that the lives and morals of the people are affected by this bill, I cannot yet see that his inference is just, or that our compliance with the motion is, therefore, necessary.

That under the present regulation, the miseries of the nation are every day increased; that corruption spreads every day wider, and debauchery makes greater havock, is confessed on all sides; and, therefore, I can discover no reason for continuing the laws in their present state, nor can think that we ought to decline any experiment by which that disorder, which cannot be increased, may possibly be lessened.

It is confessed by the noble lords, who declare their approbation of the motion for postponing the consideration of this bill, that they intend nothing less than a gentle and tacit manner of dropping it, by showing the commons that though to avoid offence they do not absolutely reject it, yet they cannot approve it, and will not pass it; and that, therefore, the necessity of raising supplies, requires that another bill should be formed, not liable to the same objections.

The consequence of this procedure, my lords, can only be, that either the commons will form another bill for raising money, or that they will send up this again with a new title, and such slight alterations as not the happiness of the nation, but the forms of the senate demand.

If, in return for our endeavours to reform a bill, of which they think themselves the only constitutional judges, they should send it again with only another title; what, my lords, shall we procure by the delay, but a new occasion of murmurs and discontent, a new confirmation of the power of the commons, and an establishment of senatorial chicanery, at once pernicious to the publick, and ignominious to ourselves.

That the commons, in sending back a bill that has been rejected in this house, with only a change in the title, act contrary to the end of senatorial consultations, though consistently with their external forms, cannot be denied:  but as each house is without any dependence on the other, such deviations from the principles of our constitution, however injurious to our authority, or however detrimental to the nation, cannot be punished, nor otherwise prevented, than by caution and prudence.