I know not, my lords, with what propriety this contract for the troops of Hanover can be termed a treaty.  It is well known that no power in this kingdom can enter into a treaty with a foreign state, except the king; and it is equally certain, that, with regard to Hanover, the same right is limited to the elector.  This treaty, therefore, my lords, is a treaty of the same person with himself, a treaty of which the two counterparts are to receive their ratification from being signed with the same hand.  This, surely, is a treaty of a new kind, such as no national assembly has yet considered.  Had any other power of Britain than its king, or in Hanover any other than the elector, the right of entering into publick engagements, a treaty might have been made; but as the constitution of both nations is formed, the treaty is merely chimerical and absolutely impossible.

Had such a treaty, as is thus vainly imagined, been really made, it would yet be as inconsistent with the fundamental establishment of the empire, to require that before it was ratified it should have been laid before the senate.  To make treaties, as to make war, is the acknowledged and established prerogative of the crown.  When war is declared, the senate is, indeed, to consider whether it ought to be carried on at the expense of the nation; and if treaties require any supplies to put them in execution, they likewise fall properly, at that time, under senatorial cognizance:  but to require that treaties shall not be transacted without our previous concurrence, is almost to annihilate the power of the crown, and to expose all our designs to the opposition of our enemies, before they can be completed.

If, therefore, the troops of Hanover can be of use for the performance of our stipulations, if they can contribute to the support of the house of Austria, the ministry cannot, in my opinion, be censured for having taken them into British pay; nor can we refuse our concurrence with the commons in providing for their support, unless it shall appear that the design for which all our preparations have been made is such as cannot be executed, or such as ought not to be pursued.

Several arguments have been offered to prove both these positions; one noble lord has asserted, that it is by no means for the advantage either of ourselves or any other nation, to restore the house of Austria to its ancient elevation; another, that it is, by the imperial constitutions, unlawful for any of the princes of Germany to make war upon the emperour solemnly acknowledged by the diet.  They have endeavoured to intimidate us, by turning our view to the difficulties by which our attempts are obstructed; difficulties which they affect to represent as insuperable, at least to this nation in its present state.  With this design, my lords, has the greatness of the French power been exaggerated, the faith of the king of Sardinia questioned, and the king of Prussia represented as determined to support the pretensions of the emperour; with this view has our natural strength been depreciated, and all our measures and hopes have been ridiculed, with wantonness, not very consistent with the character of a British patriot.