It has been asked, why the troops of Hanover were preferred to those of any other nation? And it has been insinuated, that our determination was influenced by motives very different from that regard which every Briton owes to the interest of his native country. But to this imputation, however specious, and however popular, it may be with great security replied, that there was no preference, because there was no choice; that there was a necessity for hiring troops, and that no other troops were to be obtained; and whoever shall endeavour to invalidate this defence, must engage in an undertaking of which I can boldly affirm, that he will find it very difficult. He must show what power would have been able or willing to have furnished us with troops on this occasion; and I am confident, that whoever shall, with this design, take a deliberate survey of the several kingdoms and states of Europe, will find, that there is no other prince to whom we could have applied on this occasion, without greater inconveniencies than can reasonably be feared from the present stipulation with Hanover.
The reasons, indeed, for which this stipulation was made, appeared so strong, when it was considered in the council, that it was unanimously determined necessary; nor was the conclusion hastily made in an assembly of particular persons, who might be suspected of favouring it from private views, and of being convened on purpose to put it in execution: it was debated by a great number with great solemnity; nor can any man say, that he only yielded to what he found it in vain to oppose; for the consent given was not a tacit acquiescence, but a verbal approbation. So far was this part of our measures from being the advice of any single man, or transacted with that solicitous secrecy which is the usual refuge of bad designs.
It has been asserted, likewise, my lords, and with much greater appearance of justice, that this whole design has been formed and conducted without the concurrence or approbation of the senate; and that, therefore, it can be considered only as a private scheme to be executed at the publick expense, as a plan formed by the ministry to aggrandize or ingratiate themselves at the hazard of the nation.
But even this, my lords, is a misrepresentation, though a misrepresentation more artful, and more difficult to defeat; because, in order to the justification of our measures, it is necessary to take a review of past transactions, and to consider what was necessarily implied by former determinations of the senate.
The period, my lords, to which this consideration will necessarily carry us back, is the time at which, after the late tedious war, a peace was, on whatever terms, concluded with France. It is well known, that the confederates demanded, among other advantages, a cession of that part of Flanders, which had been for many years in the possession of Spain, and which opened a way by which the ambition of the house of