I shall, therefore, endeavour to explain the motives upon which all these measures have been formed which we have heard so warmly censured; and show, that they were the consequences not of haste and negligence, but of vigilance and circumspection; that they were formed upon a deliberate survey of the complicated interests of the European powers, and dictated not by a partiality to Hanover, but a faithful attention to the interest of Britain.

It has been already observed by a noble lord, that there was no choice allowed us; that the state of Europe required that we should not sit unactive; and that yet there was no other method of acting, by which we could benefit our allies, or injure our enemies; and that, therefore, though our interposition had not produced all the effects which our zeal might incline us to wish, yet our conduct ought not to be condemned; because, though we did not press forward through the nearest path to the great object of our pursuit, we exerted our utmost speed in the only way that was left open.  This, my lords, is, in my opinion, a very just apology; nor do I see, that this vindication can be confuted or invalidated, otherwise than by showing, that some different measures, measures equally reasonable, were equally in our power.

But because the plea of necessity may, perhaps, be evaded; and because it is, at least, pleasing to discover, that what was necessary was likewise convenient, I shall endeavour to show, that our measures have produced already such effects as have sufficiently rewarded our expenses; and that we may yet reasonably hope, that greater advantages will arise from them.

There are, indeed, some whom it will not be easy to satisfy, some who declare not against the manner in which the war is prosecuted, but against the war itself; who think the power of France too formidable to be opposed, and the British people too much exhausted or enervated to hold any longer the balance of the continent.

I have, indeed, my lords, always declared myself of a different opinion, and have frequently endeavoured to rouse others from a kind of indolent despair and tame acquiescence in the attempts of the French, by representations of the wealth and force, the influence and alliances of our own nation.  I have often asserted, that I did not doubt but her conquests might be stopped by vigorous opposition, and that the current of her power, which had by artificial machines of policy been raised higher than its source, would subside and stagnate, when its course was no longer assisted by cowardice, and its way levelled by submission.

These, my lords, were my sentiments, and this was my language, at a time when all the powers of Europe conspired to flatter the pride of France by falling at her feet, when her nod was solicitously watched by all the princes of the empire, when there was no safety but by her protection, nor any enterprise but by her permission; when her wealth influenced the councils of nations, when war was declared at her command in the remotest corners of Europe, and every contest was submitted to her arbitration.