The next question that occurs, is, in what degree we ought to do it, and whether we should do it with our whole force?  Taking, therefore, our footing here upon this axiom, that we must contribute to it in some degree, and taking farther to our aid the reasoning of those gentlemen, who think it a work of such extreme danger, and almost desperate, the natural and evident conclusion can be only this, that as we must do it, so we must do it with the utmost vigour, and with our whole force.

We come now to consider, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made part of that force?  There are several considerations previous to the decision of this question.  First, whether they are as cheap as any other forces we can hire?  Then, whether they are as good?  Next, whether they are as properly situated?  And whether they are as much to be depended upon?  If, as to every one of these particulars, the answer must be made in the affirmative, I think it will go very far to determine the question now before you.

As to the first, that they are as cheap, nay, upon the whole, much cheaper, the estimates now upon your table, notwithstanding any cavil, do sufficiently demonstrate.

That they are as good, what man can doubt, who knows the character of the German nation?  What man can doubt, who knows the attention of his majesty to military discipline?  Those gentlemen can least pretend to doubt it, who sometimes do not spare reflections upon that attention which they insinuate to be too great.

That these troops are not properly situated, will be hardly asserted at this time, when they are actually now in Flanders, and now acting in conjunction with our troops.  Let any man consider the map of Europe, let him observe the seat of the war, and he must evidently see, that whether their service may be required in Flanders, whether upon the Rhine, or in the heart of Germany, in every one of these cases, the Hanoverian forces are as properly circumstanced and situated as any troops in Europe.

It remains in the last place to examine, whether any other troops can be better depended upon; and sure nothing can be more obvious than that we may rely with more security on these than any other.  They are subjects of the same prince, and of a prince indulgent to all his subjects, and accused by those who differ in other points from me, of being partial against the interest of his German dominions.  Unless, therefore, we arraign the first principle upon which a free government can be supported, and without which every exercise of arbitrary power would be warranted, we must allow that such a people will be faithful to such a prince, will defend him with a strict fidelity, and support his quarrel with the utmost zeal; with a zeal which can never be expected from the mercenary troops of any other foreign power.