Sir, I should then have offered my sentiments upon this question, if so many other gentlemen had not delivered my sense in so much a better manner than I thought myself able to do, that it would have appeared a great presumption in me, and would have given the house an unnecessary trouble.  The same reason had induced me to have been silent also upon this occasion, if the temper of the times, the little indulgence shown by gentlemen to one another, when they happen to differ in political opinions, and the popular circumstance in which I stand, did not in some sort oblige me to protect the vote I then gave, and that which I now intend to give, by the reasons that induce me to give it.

Sir, there are three principal considerations in this question; first, whether we are to assist the house of Austria and balance of power at all, aye or no? then, whether we ought to do it with our whole force? and lastly, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made a part of that force?

As to the first consideration, a new doctrine has been taught and inculcated for some months past, that it is of no importance to this nation what may happen on the continent; that this country being an island intrenched within its own natural boundaries, it may stand secure and unconcerned in all the storms of the rest of the world.  This doctrine, inconsistent as it is with all sense and reason, contrary as it is to the universal principles of policy by which this nation hath been governed from the conquest to this hour, is yet openly professed and avowed by many without these walls; and though no man has yet ventured to own this opinion publickly and directly in this house, yet some gentlemen even here, in effect maintain it, when they argue, that in no case this nation ought to assist or support the balance of power without the concurrence of the Dutch.  This tends inevitably to produce the same fatal effect; it reduces this country to depend upon Holland, to be a province to Holland; and France would then have no more to do to become mistress of all Europe, than to gain over one single town of the United Provinces, or to corrupt a few members of the States; it is, therefore, a doctrine of the greatest danger.  The only solid maxim is, that whoever becomes master of the continent, must in the end obtain the dominion of the sea.  To confirm this, I may venture to cite an old example, nor can I be accused of pedantry in doing of it, since it is an instance drawn from the last universal monarchy to which the world submitted.  The Romans had no sooner divided, broken and subdued those powers upon the continent of Europe, who had given a diversion in the great attempt they had long intended, than they attacked the Carthaginians, a maritime power, potent in arms, immensely opulent, possessed of the trade of the whole world, and unrivalled mistress of the sea.  Yet these people, who enjoyed no wealth, pursued no commerce, and at the commencement of their quarrel were not masters of a single ship, at length prevailed against this enemy upon their proper element, beat and destroyed their fleets, invaded their dominions, and subdued their empire.  From whence, sir, I must conclude, that we cannot wholly rely upon our situation, or depend solely on our naval power; and I may venture to reason upon this axiom, that this nation must contribute to support the house of Austria and the balance of power in some degree.