As to the sixth clause, my lords, which regards the nomination of convoys at a certain time, I can discover no reasonable objection to such a provision, or none that can preponderate against the advantages which may arise from it.  By the certain establishment of convoys, the value of insurance may be nearly fixed; merchants will know what confidence is to be reposed in the force of the ships, and, what they have, perhaps, had of late equal reason to examine, how much trust can be placed in the fidelity of the commanders.

The nomination of convoys, my lords, is, in my opinion, more likely to affright our enemies, and to deter their attempts, than to encourage them by the information which it will afford them; for nothing but our own negligence can conceal from us the naval strength of any power on earth; and we may always, while we are careful to preserve our maritime superiority, protect our merchants so powerfully, that none of our enemies shall be incited to attack them by the knowledge of the number and force of the ships appointed for their defence.

I come now, my lords, to the seventh clause; and surely to ascertain the duties of the captains to whose protection our trading vessels are intrusted, cannot appear superfluous to any of your lordships, who have read the lists of our losses, heard the complaints of our merchants, or made any inquiry into the conduct of our sea captains.  There is, I fear, too much reason to believe, that some of them have, with premeditated design, deserted the traders in places where they have known them most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; and it is to the last degree evident, that others have manifested such contempt of the merchants, and such a disregard of their interest, as may most justly expose them to the suspicion of very criminal negligence, of negligence which no community can be too watchful against, or too severely punish.

It has been affirmed by the noble lord, that it is not equitable to subject the commanders of convoys to penalties for the loss of the trading vessels, which may, perhaps, either rashly or negligently quit their protection.  That it is not reasonable to subject them to penalties, is undoubtedly true; but, my lords, it is far from being equally certain, that it is not just to expose them to a trial, in a case in which it must be almost impossible to determine falsely; in a case where the crews of, perhaps, twenty ships may be called as witnesses of their conduct, and where none, but those whose ship is lost, can be under the least temptation to offer a false testimony against them.

On this occasion, my lords, it may not be improper to obviate the objection produced by the seeming omission of penal sanctions, which is only another proof of implicit confidence in the officers of the admiralty, who have already the power, allowed to military courts, of proceeding against those who shall deviate from their orders.  This power, which is in a great degree discretionary, it was thought improper to limit, by ascertaining the punishment of crimes, which so many circumstances may aggravate or diminish; and, therefore, in my opinion, this clause is far from being so defective as the noble lord represented it.