By the second clause, my lords, there is still a power reserved to the admiralty, of dismissing these guardians of commerce from their stations, and employing them in case of great necessity in the line of battle, on this side cape Finisterre.  Not to cavil, my lords, at the term of great necessity, of which it is apparent that the commissioners of the admiralty are to judge, I would desire to be informed what measures are to be taken, if a royal navy should unluckily rove beyond this cape, which is marked out as the utmost bound of the power of the admiralty, and should there be reduced to the necessity of engaging desperately with a superiour force, or retiring ignominiously before it.  Are not our ships to pass a single league beyond their limits, in the honour or preservation of their country?  Are they to lie unactive within the sound of the battle, and wait for their enemies on this side the cape?

The third clause, my lords, is, if not absurd like the former, yet so imperfectly drawn up, that it can produce no advantage; for of what use will it be to station an officer where his majesty shall think fit? At all the royal docks there are officers already stationed, and in any other place what can an officer, deputed by his majesty, do more than hire workmen, who will as cheerfully and as diligently serve any other person?  And why may not the captain of the vessel procure necessaries for money, without the assistance of a commissioner?

In the fourth clause, my lords, nothing is proposed but what is every day practised, nor any authority conferred upon the court of admiralty, than that which it always possessed, of punishing those who disobey their orders.  The provision against the crime of wilfully springing a mast, is at least useless; for when did any man admit that he sprung his mast by design?  Or why should it be imagined that such an act of wickedness, such flagrant breach of trust, and apparent desertion of duty, would in the present state of the navy escape the severest punishment?  Would not all the officers and mariners on board the ship see that such a thing was wilfully done?  Would not they cry out—­“You are springing the mast,” and prevent it, or discover the crime, and demand punishment?

The fifth clause, my lords, is without any penal sanction, and, therefore, cannot be compulsive; nor is any thing of importance proposed in it, which is not already in the power of the senate.  Either house may now demand an account of the stations and employments of the ships of war; nor does the senate now omit to examine the conduct of our naval affairs, but because our attention is diverted by more important employments, which will not by this bill be contracted or facilitated.

The use of the provision in the sixth clause, my lords, I am not able to conceive; for to what purpose, my lords, should the ships appointed for any particular service be nominated at any stated time?  What consequence can such declarations of our designs produce, but that of informing our enemies what force they ought to provide against us?  In war, my lords, that commander has generally been esteemed most prudent, who keeps his designs most secret, and assaults the enemy in an unguarded quarter, with superiour and unexpected strength.